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The Internet and the advance of communication technologies have brought unprece -
dented opportunities for harnessing the creative potential of people all over the world. In
an attempt to utilize this potential to explore breakthrough new product ideas and find
solutions to challenging innovation problems, companies make extensive use of crowd -
sourcing practices. However, despite its promise, our knowledge of crowdsourcing is limited.
In this dissertation, we contribute to a greater understanding of the dynamics of
crowdsourcing by providing a comprehensive investigation of the behavioral factors that
influence innovative behavior and the performance of the crowd. Specifically, we examine
motivational, knowledge and relational mechanisms of crowd engagement, creativity and
knowledge-sharing behavior. We demonstrate that crowd members engage in new product
ideation and innovative problem solving for different reasons (i.e., intrinsic, extrin sic,
prosocial and learning motivation), and monetary rewards impact creativity in different
ways, according to individuals’ prosocial motivation. In addition, we find that a crowd
member’s performance in solving innovation problems is a consequence of the interplay
between his/her expertise and how broadly and deeply he/she searches for solutions.
Finally, we show that fear of opportunism by others – the main relational risk attached to
disclosing knowledge in crowdsourcing platforms – is not uniform among crowd members,
and trust in the owner of the crowdsourcing platform is central in assuaging such fears. As
a whole, the studies in this dissertation provide important insights into how crowd sourcing
platforms can be better designed and how the immense creative potential of the crowd
can be used more effectively.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
nnovation has long been considered an important capability for the survival, success 
and growth of companies. The traditional approach for organizations to build
innovation capabilities has been to develop internal innovation capability by means 
of investment in R&D capabilities since these capabilities are regardad as a strategic asset 
for competitive advantage (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; Chesbrough, 2003). Social and 
economic changes, market structure and technological advances have put pressure on 
organizations to move towards a more open model of innovation while providing
immense opportunities (Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). The benefits of 
openness have been extensively highlighted by researchers, and the importance of 
external sources for organizational innovativeness has also been widely recognized.
Scholars have found that using ideas and knowledge from external sources, interacting 
and collaborating with external parties and searching for new opportunities beyond 
organizational boundaries lead to better innovation performance (e.g., Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Research has also focused on 
the role of different external sources, including customers (e.g. Von Hippel, 1976), 
suppliers (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995), competitors (e.g. Allen, 1983), universities 
(e.g. Broström and Lööf, 2008) and other institutions (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
An emerging external channel for open innovation which offers great potential is 
crowdsourcing. The Internet and advance of communication technologies have brought 
I
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unprecedented opportunities for organizations to tap into diverse ideas, knowledge and 
creative potential all over the world. Many organizations typically use either tournament-
based crowdsourcing (where members of the crowd compete with each other in a contest)
or collaboration-based crowdsourcing (where members of the crowd collaborate with 
each other) to harness the innovative potential of the crowd (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; 
Bayus, 2013). Two well-known examples of tournament-based crowdsourcing are 
InnoCentive and TopCoder. They act as an intermediary between the organizations and 
the crowd, post the innovation problems in their online platform and organize contests 
aimed at solving them. Among others, organizations such as Toyota, Procter & Gamble 
and NASA are actively using these platforms. Another well-known example of
tournament-based crowdsourcing was Netflix’s 1 million dollar contest for an algorithm 
to improve its existing recommendation system by at least 10 percent where the company 
used an open call to the world to encourage crowd participation. In collaboration-based 
crowdsourcing, a large community typically generates, discusses and evaluates ideas 
repeatedly over time (Bayus, 2013). For example, Dell and Starbucks have their own 
dedicated online platforms for crowdsourcing. They have received hundreds of thousands
of ideas since starting these platforms and have already implemented more than a 
thousand of those ideas.
POTENTIAL OF CROWDSOURCING FOR INNOVATION
Crowdsourcing is highly important for innovation for several reasons. First, it enables 
organizations to access a pool of knowledge that is larger and more diversified than any 
single organization, no matter how large, would have on its own. A knowledge pool of 
this kind is highly important for innovation as it allows an organization to tap into 
multiple sources of diverse knowledge; this, in turn, is likely to stimulate innovativeness 
as innovation is often cumulative and generated by recombining existing knowledge 
(Fleming, 2001; Murray & O’Mahony, 2007). There is substantial empirical evidence to 
highlight the benefits of new, diverse and distant knowledge for developing new 
capabilities (e.g. Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; March, 1991), producing path-breaking 
innovations (e.g. Fleming, 2001; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004), and shaping the evolution of 
an industry (e.g. Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). 
2 
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Second, crowdsourcing increases the likelihood of reaching extreme outcomes 
(Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009) as it typically attracts 
a large number of ideas and solutions (Afuah & Tucci, 2012) and therefore increases the 
chances of achieving at least one outstanding outcome. Because innovation is all about 
extremes, rather than overall averages, such outstanding outcomes are fundamental for 
innovation (Dahan & Mendelson, 2001; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010). 
Third, innovation is a complex and uncertain process which involves trial and error, 
experimentation and false steps (Loch, Terwiesch, & Thomke, 2001; Sommer & Loch, 
2004). As several ideas are generated, developed and tested concurrently in 
crowdsourcing (particularly when solving technical problems), this parallel processing 
helps to reveal in advance potential failures or false steps. This is not only more cost-
effective compared to internal development, as payments are made only for the successful 
ideas, solutions and experiments, but it also has great potential for shortening the 
innovation process (i.e., improving cycle times) as some of the problems that might 
prevent or slow down the innovation process can then be foreseen. 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
Although using crowdsourcing as an innovation source for exploring creative ideas 
and solutions is becoming more common for organizations and has immense potential to 
improve innovativeness, research has lagged behind these recent developments. Scholars 
have recently started to highlight the importance of integrating different theories in order 
to understand the dynamics of crowdsourcing platforms (Boudreau et al., 2011; Lampel, 
Jha, & Bhalla, 2012; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009). The main purpose of my thesis is to 
expand our understanding on the dynamics of crowdsourcing for innovation. That is, I 
aim to shed light on the behavioral, social, and contextual factors behind the generation 
and sharing of innovative ideas in crowdsourcing platforms. I addressed these questions 
by using a broad theoretical lens and integrating multidisciplinary perspectives from 
management literature on innovation, social psychology literature on creativity, and 
economics literature on knowledge disclosure and creation. 
3
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This thesis explicitly addresses the use of crowdsourcing practices to improve 
innovation processes. To elaborate, it examines crowdsourcing of ideas and solutions that 
are developed for the front end of new product development processes and for 
overcoming problems that arise in new product development processes. In addition, I
focus specifically on tournament-based crowdsourcing – contests in which organizations 
disclose details of their innovation-related problem to an undefined and typically large 
group of individuals, invite voluntary participation by anyone who considers 
himself/herself qualified to solve the problem, and make an award for the solution they 
decide to be the best (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Howe, 2006; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; 
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Some studies refer to this phenomenon by names such as 
innovation contests (Boudreau et al., 2011; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), innovation 
tournaments (Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009), design competitions (Lampel et al., 2012) or 
broadcast search (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010).
I collaborated closely with InnoCentive – one of the largest tournament-based 
crowdsourcing platforms in the world and the global leader in crowdsourcing innovation 
problems. Our collaboration included company visits, collecting archival data on 
problems broadcast in the InnoCentive platform, undertaking a large field survey with the
InnoCentive solver community, conducting qualitative interviews with solvers and 
employees and extracting textual data from the Internet. In addition to this rich field data, 
in collaboration with TomTom I conducted new product idea-generation experiments.
This thesis takes a behavioral perspective and focused on the factors relating to 
innovative outcomes (i.e., ideas and solutions) devised by the members of the crowd. This 
was because I believe that having a deep understanding of individuals that make up the 
crowd is one of the central steps in giving us a better understanding of crowdsourcing and 
enabling us to use its immense potential. Put differently, it is crucial to understand the 
heterogeneity of the crowd in terms of motivations, attitudes, abilities, and perceptions, 
and how that heterogeneity influences the behavior of the crowd. To elaborate, this thesis 
sheds light on how the crowd’s innovative behavior and performance (i.e., creative 
engagement and problem-solving performance) in a specific contest is influenced by 
contest-specific factors (e.g., reward size), individual factors (e.g., motivations, expertise) 
4 
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and the interplay between these factors. It also addresses how crowd members differ in 
their attitudes toward the parties on the other side of the exchange (i.e., those who receive 
the ideas and those who organize the contests), looking at issues which are critical for the 
disclosure of innovative outcomes, such as participants’ trust in the contest organizers and 
their fears that the knowledge they disclose might be used opportunistically by others. As 
a whole, by understanding behavioral, motivational and ability-related differences in 
various crowdsourcing contests and the effects they can have on the innovative outcomes 
produced, and by recognizing individual differences in attitudes to sharing outcomes, I
aim to explain how crowdsourcing platforms can be better designed.
In the first study, I and my coauthor examined the motivational mechanisms of 
creativity in a crowdsourcing platform. To that end, we investigated how the interplay 
between monetary rewards – one of the most extensively used ways of motivating people 
to a particular outcome and a key element of the design of crowdsourcing contests – and 
the motivation of crowd members influence the creativity of the ideas generated. 
Creativity is extremely important for organizational innovativeness because the success of 
innovation and new product development very often depends on the creativity of the ideas 
underlying them. By drawing on recent research on the psychological consequences of 
money, we identified prosocial motivation as a contingency that determines the form and 
strength of the relationship between rewards and creativity. More specifically, we suggest 
that rewards would have a positive effect on creativity for people with low prosocial 
motivation; however, this effect would be diminished with increased levels of prosocial 
motivation. In addition, we argue that rewards would affect creativity through the primary 
avenue of creative self-efficacy. We triangulated empirical evidence for these hypotheses 
from a large field survey in a crowdsourcing platform and an idea-generation experiment 
in a laboratory. The primary contribution of this study is that it sheds light on the 
controversy about the relationship between rewards and creativity, and extends our 
understanding of the motivational mechanisms of creativity in crowdsourcing platforms.
This study is presented in several academic conferences and seminars including Academy 
of Management Annual Meeting (2013) and Organization Science Winter Conference 
(2012), and currently being prepared for submission to a management journal. I am the 
first author of this paper and the promoter of this dissertation, Jan van den Ende, is a co-
5
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author.  
In the second study, we addressed knowledge mechanisms of problem solving in 
crowdsourcing platforms. Specifically, we investigated how problem-solving 
performance is influenced by the interplay between the crowd member's level of expertise 
in the problem to which a solution is being sought and the knowledge search that the 
crowd member conducts. The core idea in this study is that problem-solving performance 
is the result of individuals’ expertise and the specific behaviors they engage in when 
searching for a solution. By analyzing knowledge-search behavior used to tackle 139 
innovation problems, we found that, as predicted, expertise is positively related to 
problem-solving performance when it is complemented by appropriate knowledge-search 
behavior. More specifically, expertise was expected to have a positive effect on 
performance only when a broad knowledge search was used. Although broad search was 
required for the performance-enhancing effects of expertise, breadth of the search was not
enough on its own. For such positive effects, the knowledge search should also be shallow 
in the problem domain and in domains that are outside the problem domain, but should be 
deep in domains that are related to the problem domain (i.e., domains that are at the 
boundaries of the problem domain). By bringing together psychology literature on how 
expertise affects problem solving and management literature on the link between 
knowledge search and problem solving, this study sheds light on previously rather
equivocal findings on how expertise and problem-solving performance are related. It also 
explains the knowledge mechanisms behind problem solving in crowdsourcing platforms 
– of great importance as problem-solving effectiveness is essential for organizational 
innovativeness and performance (Atuahene-Gima & Wei, 2011; Nickerson & Zenger, 
2004). From a practical standpoint, organizers of crowdsourcing contests can benefit from 
our findings by encouraging specific knowledge-search behavior. This study is presented 
in Copenhagen Conference on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, and currently being 
prepared for submission to a management journal. I am the first author of this paper and 
the promoter of this dissertation is a co-author. This paper also benefited highly from 
feedback of Melissa Schilling. 
6 
24
Chapter 1 
In the third study, we focused on relational mechanisms of knowledge disclosure in 
crowdsourcing platforms. To that end, we examined individual differences in the main 
relational risk in crowdsourcing platforms and one of the most critical factors in solvers’ 
knowledge-sharing behavior: fear of opportunism (Arrow, 1962; Szulanski, 1996). By
conducting qualitative interviews and surveys with people who disclose knowledge in a 
crowdsourcing platform, we found that there are individual differences in the degree to 
which they fear opportunism, and that women and older participants have significantly 
less fear of disclosing their knowledge. We explain this relationship in terms of the better 
emotional regulation and stronger orientation towards altruism that aging may bring and 
gender differences in perceptions of the sincerity and good intentions of others. Also, trust 
in the intermediary organization is crucial in mitigating such fears. This study has 
important implications for micro-level knowledge theory and helps to clarify the 
relational relational mechanisms of knowledge disclosure in crowdsourcing platforms. 
This study is presented in Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2013 and 
Organization Science Winter Conference 2013, and currently invited for revise and 
resubmit at an interdisciplinary journal. I am the first author of this paper and the 
promoter of this dissertation is a co-author.  
In the final chapter, I summarize and integrate the findings of the three studies and 
provide an overview of motivational, knowledge and relational underpinnings of idea 
generation and sharing in crowdsourcing platforms. I then discuss the general theoretical 
implications of this thesis for the management, psychology and economics literatures,
together with its practical implications for better management of crowdsourcing 
platforms. Finally, I highlight some potentially fruitful avenues for future research that 
could help to give us a more comprehensive understanding of how to harness the power 
of the crowd for the purposes of innovation. 
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Chapter 2
CAN’T BUY ME CREATIVITY? THE ROLE OF 
PROSOCIAL MOTIVATION AND CREATIVE 
SELF-EFFICACY IN THE REWARD-
CREATIVITY LINK
INTRODUCTION
rganizations are continuously in need of, and on the look-out for, creative ideas 
to improve their processes, develop new products or find the next big 
breakthrough in their industry. Quite often, they use monetary rewards to 
encourage their employees, customers or others to engage in creative activities for them 
(Baer, Oldham, & Cummings, 2003; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). For example, KPN, the 
largest telecommunication company in the Netherlands, pays employees for their creative 
ideas, with amounts ranging from about 20 to 10,000 Euros (van Dijk & van den Ende, 
2002). Many other companies spend millions of dollars to utilize the creative potential of 
the people on the Internet; for instance, the total rewards given for ideas and solutions in 
InnoCentive, one of the largest online platforms for creative idea generation, exceeds 40 
million dollars. 
Despite the extensive use of monetary rewards to encourage engagement in creative 
activities, most of the creativity literature advises against using rewards to stimulate 
creativity (George, 2007; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). This argument stems from self-
determination theory which postulates that external factors (including rewards) will 
diminish the perceptions of self-determination (i.e., feelings of being the originator of 
O
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one’s own behavior) and, in turn, intrinsic motivation and creativity (Amabile, 1996; 
Gagne & Deci, 2005). The self-determination perspective is accepted very broadly in the 
creativity literature (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Zhou & Shalley, 2003); however, 
another group of scholars argue that monetary rewards will increase creativity as long as 
those rewards are tied to a creativity goal (Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Eisenberger & 
Rhoades, 2001). This stream of research embraces a goal-setting perspective: that is, 
rewards are valuable in clarifying the goal of the activity and in encouraging goal-directed 
behavior. Proponents of both opposing perspectives on the reward-creativity link have 
provided considerable empirical evidence for their arguments, and debate over the 
direction of the effects of rewards on creativity has continued throughout the past decade 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). In their review of the creativity literature, Zhou and 
Shalley (2003: 204) termed this controversy over the relationship between rewards and 
creativity “the paradox of rewards”. 
In this paper, we take a step towards resolving this paradox by introducing prosocial 
motivation as a moderator of the reward-creativity link. Prosocial motivation refers to the 
desire to expend effort to help other people (Grant, 2007, 2008). Drawing on recent 
literature on the psychological consequences of money (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006, 
2008), we theorize that people with low prosocial motivation will respond positively to 
increased monetary rewards, as predicted by goal-setting theory; however, this positive 
effect will be diminished at higher levels of prosocial motivation, in line with the rationale 
of self-determination theory. Although recent research found that the reward-creativity 
relationship might change depending on the reward characteristics (e.g., reward 
contingency, choice of reward) or task characteristics (e.g., task complexity) (Baer et al., 
2003; Byron & Khazanchi, 2012), there has been little research to address the possibility 
that the effects of rewards may not be uniform across all individuals (for an exception, see 
Baer et al. [2003]). Our study demonstrates how different individuals respond to the same 
reward differently, and introduces an internal psychological process (i.e., prosocial 
motivation) that might be an important factor in explaining why rewards stimulate or 
inhibit creativity. In so doing, the paper provides a conceptual framework to reconcile the 
two opposing theoretical views on the reward-creativity link.
10 
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We shed further light on ‘the paradox of rewards’ by identifying a psychological 
mechanism that underlies the interaction effect of monetary rewards and prosocial 
motivation on creativity. Building on the theories of self-efficacy development (Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992), we introduce creative self-efficacy – defined as the individual’s belief that 
he or she has the ability to generate creative outcomes (Tierney & Farmer, 2002) – as a key 
mediating mechanism in the reward-creativity link. We argue that increased monetary 
rewards will have different efficacy cues (i.e., information cues relating to the formation of 
self-efficacy) for individuals with different levels of prosocial motivation, which will in 
turn influence creative self-efficacy judgments and subsequent creativity. Although prior 
research has focused almost exclusively on intrinsic motivation as the main underlying 
mechanism between contextual factors (including rewards) and creativity, only a few 
studies have tested empirically whether intrinsic motivation actually mediates the link 
between the context and creativity (Shalley et al., 2004; Zhou & Shalley, 2003). Moreover, 
these studies have shown inconsistent results (e.g., Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2001; Shin & 
Zhou, 2003). This is why George (2007: 445), in her review of the creativity literature, 
suggested that “rather than assume that intrinsic motivation underlies creativity, 
researchers need to tackle this theorized linkage more directly and in more depth”. By 
including both intrinsic motivation and creative self-efficacy in our model, we follow this 
suggestion and go beyond the widely held assumption in the creativity literature that 
singular mediating process of intrinsic motivation explains the internal processes of the 
reward-creativity link (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Shalley et al., 2004).  
We tested our hypotheses in a field study, and subsequently in a lab experiment which 
supports both the internal and external validity of our results. Our field study is in the 
context of a crowdsourcing platform: InnoCentive. Crowdsourcing is a recent approach 
that is increasingly being used to harness the creative potential of people on a global scale; 
organizations broadcast their innovation problems via an online platform and thereby 
attempt to reach individuals throughout the whole world in order to generate ideas for 
solving those problems (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). By examining 
creativity in a crowdsourcing platform, we contribute to a greater understanding of the 
emerging phenomenon of crowdsourcing, which has remarkable potential for improving 
organizational innovativeness (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Lampel et al., 2012; Nishikawa, 
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Schreier, & Ogawa, 2013). We started our analysis by conducting interviews and content 
analyses to explore perceptions of monetary rewards and the role of prosocial motivation 
in InnoCentive. We then conducted a large-scale survey with community members from 
the InnoCentive platform. In the laboratory experiment, using different operationalizations 
of creative self-efficacy and creativity, we constructively replicated the findings of the 
field study in a controlled environment. 
Our research makes three main theoretical contributions to the creativity and 
motivation literature. First, by theorizing on how and why rewards impact creativity in 
different ways according to an individual’s prosocial motivation, our study takes the first 
steps towards developing a theoretical rationale for reconciling the opposing perspectives 
of goal-setting and self-determination theories on the reward-creativity link. Second, we 
introduce and provide important first empirical evidence for a new mediating mechanism 
on the reward-creativity link, as we demonstrate that the interaction effect of prosocial 
motivation and rewards influences creativity primarily by increasing feelings of self-
efficacy in relation to the creative task. Third, we extend recent research that focuses on 
motivational interactions to explain creativity. This line of research has demonstrated that 
intrinsic and prosocial motivations have synergistic effects on creativity (Grant & Berry, 
2011); however, other potential motivational interactions remain unknown. Our study 
therefore adds to motivation and creativity literature by identifying an unexplored 
motivational interaction that has an influence on creativity, namely between an extrinsic 
source of motivation (i.e., monetary rewards) and prosocial motivation. As a whole, our 
study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex motivational processes 
involved in creativity by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework, which 
integrates goal-setting and self-determination theories, self-interested and other-oriented 
motivations, and internal psychological mechanisms of creativity.
12 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Rewards and Creativity
The emphasis of this paper is on building a better understanding of how rewards 
influence creativity. In the prior literature, creativity is often defined from an outcome 
perspective – creativity refers to development of novel and useful ideas (Amabile, 1996; 
George, 2007). Less research has been focused on creativity from a process perspective, 
that is, where creativity refers to engagement in creative activities independent of the 
qualities of the outcome (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Shalley et al., 2004). In this 
paper, we incorporate both perspectives in our theoretical model, and use creativity as an 
umbrella term encompassing both the outcome and process perspectives of creativity. We 
use the term creative engagement to denote the process view of creativity and use creative 
performance to specify the outcome view. Our theorizing and focus in this paper will be on 
the monetary rewards that are offered for creativity (i.e., creativity-contingent rewards) 
because this reflects the basic logic behind using rewards to enhance creativity (i.e., 
rewards direct effort and attention to the activity they are given for) and because monetary 
rewards are one of the most common forms of rewards used by organizations to motivate 
employees to engage in creative (and non-creative) activities (Baer et al., 2003; Gerhart, 
Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009; Prendergast, 1999; van Dijk & van den Ende, 2002)
The literature on the relationship between rewards and creativity is divided mainly into 
two opposing camps (Baer et al., 2003; Shalley et al., 2004; see Byron & Khazanchi, 2012, 
for a meta-analysis). On the one hand, often drawing on self-determination theory, scholars 
have postulated that rewards are detrimental to creativity (Amabile, 1996; Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010). Empirical evidence for this view mostly comes from experimental studies 
that involved children and young adults as subjects and from tasks that addressed artistic 
creativity such as drawing or story-writing (e.g., Amabile, Hennessey, & Grossman, 1986; 
Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971). Baer and his colleagues (2003) also provided 
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support for this view in a field study, noting that for complex tasks there is a negative 
relationship between rewards and creative performance. On the other hand, some scholars 
have argued that rewards will enhance creativity (e.g., Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; 
Eisenberger & Aselage, 2009). This line of research embraces a goal-setting perspective, 
although often without mentioning this explicitly. Empirical research provides support for 
this view in both field studies and experiments with children and college students (e.g.,
Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001). 
As a whole, the two opposing schools of thought on the reward-creativity link have 
highlighted two distinct functions of rewards in influencing creativity: informational and 
controlling (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012; Shalley et al., 2004). Scholars who draw on goal-
setting theory highlight the informational aspects of rewards while largely neglecting the
possibility that rewards can diminish feelings of autonomy. Scholars who embrace self-
determination theory, however, emphasize the controlling aspects of rewards but often 
disregard the informational function of rewards in terms of directing effort and attention 
towards being more creative. Moreover, both streams have often predicted that rewards 
will affect the creativity of different individuals in a fairly uniform way and they have 
generally overlooked the role of psychological factors in determining how individuals 
respond to rewards (for an exception, see Baer et al. [2003] who studied the moderating 
role of cognitive style). We argue that individual differences might be of importance in 
integrating these contradictory predictions as to the link between reward and creativity 
because individuals give diverse meaning to, and respond differently to, the same 
contextual factors (Drazin et al., 1999; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & 
Griffin, 1993).
Moderating Role of Prosocial Motivation 
Our core premise in this paper is that the level of prosocial motivation determines how 
monetary rewards will be perceived and, in turn, how they will influence creativity – i.e., 
engagement and performance in creative activities. Prosocial motivation refers to the 
desire to exert effort in order to help and benefit others (Grant, 2007, 2008). We expect 
that people with high prosocial motivation for a task might perceive the rewards as more 
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controlling, and therefore respond to increased monetary rewards in line with the 
predictions of the self-determination theory. This is because increased monetary rewards 
induce an orientation towards the self and away from others (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008), 
which conflicts with the internal processes of prosocially motivated people who have a 
strong orientation towards helping others (Grant, 2008). Perceiving rewards as more 
controlling has certain negative consequences for feelings of  self-determination  – the 
sense of being the originator of one’s own behavior (Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2001; Shalley 
et al., 2004). When individuals feel that the origins of their behavior lie in extrinsic factors 
(i.e., their behavior is not self-determined), their sense of autonomy and experience of 
choice will be hampered, and this will be detrimental in terms of the motivational energy 
and playful engagement required for creative outcomes (Gagne & Deci, 2005; Liu, Chen, 
& Yao, 2011; Mainemelis & Ronson, 2006). 
In contrast, when people have low prosocial motivation, increased reward size will not 
conflict with their motivational orientation, and therefore will not hamper their sense of 
self-determination. Instead, those people are likely to perceive rewards as informational 
and respond to increased monetary rewards in the way that goal-setting theory predicts. 
This theory suggests that rewards will influence creative performance by affecting the 
goals set by individuals and their level of commitment to those goals (Locke, Bryan, & 
Kendall, 1968; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). To elaborate, when there are higher 
monetary rewards, people will set more challenging creativity goals than they would with 
lower levels of monetary reward (Locke & Latham, 1990), and this will in turn enhance 
their creative performance (Shalley, 1991, 1995). They will also commit more effort in 
order to reach those creativity goals (Locke et al., 1968). In the light of the reasoning 
above, we propose that prosocial motivation is a moderating factor in the reward-creative 
engagement and the reward-creative performance relationships. 
Hypothesis 1: Prosocial motivation moderates the association between size of 
monetary reward and creative engagement in such a way that the lower the prosocial 
motivation, the stronger the association between size of monetary reward and creative 
engagement.
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Hypothesis 2: Prosocial motivation moderates the association between size of 
monetary reward and creative performance in such a way that the lower the prosocial 
motivation, the stronger the association between size of monetary reward and creative 
performance.
The Mediating Role of Creative Self-Efficacy
Regardless of the arguments over the direction in which rewards may affect creativity, 
prior research has focused mainly on the role of intrinsic motivation as the mediating 
factor in this link (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Shalley et al., 2004). While we do not 
contest the relevance of intrinsic motivation for creativity, we believe that to reach a 
comprehensive understanding of the internal mechanisms between rewards and creativity it 
is important to consider alternative mediators. The reasons are twofold. First, empirical 
research on the mediating role of intrinsic motivation in the rewards-creativity link is 
scarce and the results have been equivocal. For instance, Eisenberger and Aselage (2009)
found evidence for the mediating role of intrinsic motivation in the reward-creativity 
relationship in one of their studies but failed to do so in another study in the same paper. In 
fact, the equivocal results about the mediating role of intrinsic motivation are not limited to 
the literature on the reward-creativity link; inconsistent results are also common in the 
broader literature on contextual factors and creativity (George, 2007; Shalley et al., 2004). 
Second, intrinsic motivation is unlikely to explain creative processes that do not involve 
positive feelings of enjoyment, interest and excitement. To elaborate, creative processes 
also include processes that are characterized by feelings of desperation, frustration, stress 
and tedium (Lubart, 2001; Zhou & George, 2003). For example, some biographical 
accounts point to the struggles, agony and stress that famous artists experience in their 
creative processes (e.g., Bernstein, 2004). Therefore, we argue that although intrinsic 
motivation is likely to explain the positive feelings which are essential for creativity, it 
might fall short in explaining the non-intrinsically motivating parts of the processes which 
are inherent in creative endeavors. 
In this paper, we introduce creative self-efficacy as a mediating mechanism for the 
interaction effect of prosocial motivation and rewards on creativity. Creative self-efficacy 
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refers to “the belief one has the ability to produce creative outcomes” (Tierney & Farmer, 
2002: 1138) and it is a motivational force that differs from intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation concerns a focus on the task itself and is present-focused – having fun while 
engaging in the task (Grant, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2000) – whereas creative self-efficacy 
concerns a focus on the outcome and is future-focused – the expectation of achieving a 
good performance after engaging in the task (Bandura, 1997; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). In 
other words, intrinsic motivation is about engaging in a task because it is fun without any 
concern for the end performance; self-efficacy, by contrast, is about feelings of being 
competent enough to perform well without any concern for the potential fun aspects of the 
task. 
We focus specifically on creative self-efficacy as a mediating mechanism for two main 
reasons. First, feelings of self-efficacy in relation to creative performance might be an 
essential self-regulatory mechanism that would explain why some individuals persist in 
non-intrinsically motivating processes of creativity. Prior research identified self-efficacy 
as a vital motivational force which sustains individuals in creative activities that are 
challenging and risky (Bandura, 1997; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). In addition, self-efficacy 
might influence cognitive mechanisms that are important for creativity such as broader 
information search (Cervone, Jiwani, & Wood, 1991). Second, self-efficacy is an 
important psychological mechanism that can explain the effects of changes in the social-
contextual factors on subsequent creativity (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Tierney & Farmer, 
2002). Several recent studies have provided empirical evidence for the mediating role of 
creative self-efficacy between contextual factors and creativity (e.g., Gong, Huang, & 
Farh, 2009; Tierney & Farmer, 2011). For example, Gong and colleagues (2009) found 
that creative self-efficacy is the mediating mechanism between transformational leadership 
and creativity. 
We argue that creative self-efficacy might be a crucial mediating mechanism in the 
interaction of rewards and prosocial motivation on creativity because increased reward size 
may have different efficacy cues for people with different levels of prosocial motivation. 
When increased monetary rewards are perceived as a controlling factor (i.e., when 
prosocial motivation is high), people will experience a reduced sense of autonomy, and this 
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might communicate certain messages that can diminish their feelings of creative self-
efficacy (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). That is, giving someone autonomy in a certain task is an 
expression of confidence in that person’s capabilities to perform well without requiring 
any control (Grant & Parker, 2009). For example, Frese and his colleagues (2007) found 
that autonomy at work is significantly correlated with self-efficacy. An indirect empirical 
support for this argument comes from Parker (1998), who found that autonomy is 
associated with higher perceived self-efficacy in carrying out work tasks that require 
proactivity. 
When perceived as informational (i.e., when prosocial motivation is low), increased 
monetary rewards are likely to enhance feelings of self-efficacy in several ways. First, 
increasing the size of a monetary reward might communicate positive information about 
competence by indicating that individuals’ potential solutions are recognized and highly
valued (Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001; Lawler, 1986); this is likely to enhance creative 
self-efficacy because social cues that communicate competence enhance feelings of self-
efficacy (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Second, it signals a higher level of expectation on the 
part of the reward-giver which might persuade people that they are capable of generating 
creative outcomes and lead to subsequent attributions that promote a sense of self-efficacy 
(e.g., “I must be competent in creative activities if I am expected to be creative”) (Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992; Tierney & Farmer, 2011). For example, empirical research found that both 
actual expectations of supervisors and mere perceptions that higher creativity performance 
is expected serve to increase creative self-efficacy (Tierney & Farmer, 2004, 2011). In the 
light of the reasoning above, we propose that the interaction effect of prosocial motivation 
and reward size will influence creative engagement and performance through feelings of 
creative self-efficacy. Figure 1 depicts our theoretical model. The dashed lines in the figure 
correspond to the relationships that were discussed in the prior literature whereas the solid 
lines show the relationships that we hypothesize in this paper. 
Hypothesis 3: Creative self-efficacy mediates the moderating effect of prosocial 
motivation on the relationship between size of monetary reward and creative 
engagement.
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Hypothesis 4: Creative self-efficacy mediates the moderating effect of prosocial 
motivation on the relationship between size of monetary reward and creative 
performance.
FIGURE 1
Theoretical Model
                                     Relationships hypothesized in this study     
                                     Relationships discussed in the prior literature
Overview of the Present Research
Employing a multi-method approach, we tested these hypotheses in a field study and a 
laboratory experiment. The field study allowed us to enhance the external validity of our 
results by testing our predictions in an actual organizational setting and to investigate the 
effects of naturally occurring variations in monetary rewards and prosocial motivation on 
creative engagement. In this study, we tested the hypotheses related to creative 
engagement (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 3) in a crowdsourcing platform. Before collecting 
survey data from the members of the crowdsourcing platform to test these hypotheses, we 
took an exploratory approach (i.e., we conducted in-depth interviews and investigated the 
publicly available content) in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the 
crowdsourcing context and substantiate our constructs and hypotheses (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). We complemented the field study with a laboratory experiment, which 
allowed us to draw causal conclusions on the effects of reward size on creativity and to 
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enhance the internal validity of our results by utilizing random assignment procedures 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). In the experiment, we tested Hypotheses 1-4, and 
constructively replicated the results of the field study using different operationalizations of 
creative self-efficacy and creative engagement (Lykken, 1968).  
STUDY 1
Research Setting
We conducted this study in the context of a crowdsourcing platform. Crowdsourcing 
refers to the act of taking a task once performed internally and opening it up to a large, 
undefined group of people external to the company in the form of an open call (Bayus, 
2013; Howe, 2008). Crowdsourcing offers immense potential for harnessing the creative 
potential of people on a global scale by providing an unprecedented arena for exploring 
creative ideas and solutions from both expected and unexpected sources (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Lampel et al., 2012). We collaborated with InnoCentive 
– one of the largest and earliest crowdsourcing platforms for innovation purposes. It offers 
an online platform for matching the innovation problems of its clients (i.e. seekers) to its 
community (i.e., solvers). Seekers share a specific problem (i.e., challenge) with 
InnoCentive, and InnoCentive then broadcasts this challenge on its online platform. Each 
challenge requires creative idea generation and problem solving as the problems are ones 
that typically could not be solved by the internal R&D department of the company. For 
example, these challenges could be related to new product design (e.g., developing a dual-
purpose solar light that would function as a lamp and a flashlight) or novel solutions for 
the problems in the innovation process (e.g., method for measuring the thickness of thin 
polymeric films). After a challenge is posted, solvers submit their ideas and solutions by 
means of a written report. The winning solution is selected by the seeker and rewarded 
with a prize, typically ranging from 10,000-100,000 U.S. dollars. 
As crowdsourcing is an emergent phenomenon, we started our research with an 
exploratory approach. In the exploratory phase, we employed multiple data sources in 
order to strengthen our understanding of the context and substantiate our constructs and 
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hypotheses (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). More specifically, we conducted 23 semi-
structured in-depth interviews with solvers (10 interviews) and employees of InnoCentive 
(13 interviews) and examined information publicly available on the Internet. Following the 
recommendations of Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) to incorporate diverse views about 
the questions of interest, we interviewed people in the solver community who had had 
different levels of success (i.e. multiple winners, single winners and non-winners) and 
people at different levels in the company hierarchy. In addition, we investigated content in 
the InnoCentive blog (358 posts), forums (77 posts) and LinkedIn (193 posts) groups that 
came from more than 80 individual solvers. 
In the interviews and analysis of the online content, we sought answers to three 
questions that are critical for further steps of this study. We first probed whether monetary 
rewards have a consistent positive effect in this context and whether this effect is the same 
for all people. A comment by an employee in InnoCentive illustrated the experience of the 
company in relation to the effects of monetary rewards: “It is hard to understand solvers’ 
motivation by dollar amounts; some challenges get more popular with a very low amount 
of money”. Regarding the reaction of solvers, we found evidence that solvers varied in the 
way they processed information about monetary rewards. For example, one solver 
explained this process by saying: “I look at the award money and make deliberate 
calculations of worth of time, risk and chance of winning”, whereas another solver stated 
that, “5,000 or 50,000 is not important to me…… real excitement is in the feeling of having 
contributed something useful that other people value…”. The second issue we addressed 
was the relevance of prosocial motivation in this context. We found strong evidence for the 
importance of prosocial motivation in driving engagement in challenges. For instance, one 
senior InnoCentive employee explained one of the core motivations of solvers as being that 
“they want to work on problems that matter”. Solvers also quite frequently identified 
prosocial reasons as one of the drivers of their behavior. For example, one said: “If you 
win, it means that you have contributed to decrease entropy on the planet”. The third 
important point for us was to identify the factors that might influence our study in general 
and hypotheses in particular. Here we identified the reasons why solvers participate and 
exert effort in the challenges. In addition, we examined several personal and contextual 
factors that might influence our study in an attempt to rule out a bias for potentially 
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omitted variables. This process also allowed us to adapt our survey items (from existing 
scales in the literature) for InnoCentive. Findings from the interviews and content analysis 
that relate to measurement are discussed in detail in the measures section.  
Sample and Procedures
In addition to providing preliminary insights about our hypotheses in the exploratory 
analysis, we used a web-based survey tool to collect data from the solvers of InnoCentive. 
Our population was the active solvers – those who participate in challenges. In other 
words, we were not interested in people who have an InnoCentive account but are not 
active in the community, only read the challenge descriptions, or never participate in the 
challenges. Our sample included all submissions by solvers between December 2009 and 
May 2012 for “Reduction-to-Practice” challenges (i.e., the challenges that require a 
detailed description of the solution and a prototype that shows the solution will work in
practice) and “Theoretical” challenges (i.e., the challenges that require detailed 
descriptions, specifications and supporting precedents). We selected the latest submission 
if a solver had made multiple submissions within the specified period. 
The entire survey was in English as all the challenges in InnoCentive are posted in 
English. Participants were from different backgrounds, ranging from experts (academics, 
consultants) to students. Using contact information retrieved from InnoCentive, a 
customized e-mail (i.e., addressing the solver and including specific challenge details that 
we request information for) and an URL survey link, was sent to 3,005 solvers. The e-mail 
made plain that the researchers were partnering with InnoCentive and that solvers’ 
responses were very important to us. Solvers were also informed by a manager from 
InnoCentive, via the LinkedIn groups and the InnoCentive blog, that InnoCentive was 
collaborating with us and that solvers might soon receive an email about the study. A 
reminder was sent a week later, using a dynamic strategy (i.e., the time, day and text of the 
initial email was changed) to enhance the response rate (Sauermann & Roach, 2012). We 
received 744 (24.8 %) responses. Of those, 636 (21.2%) were usable for our analysis1. The 
1 We excluded the cases that had two or more incomplete answers in a construct. We kept the cases where 
only one item in a construct was missing as we thought this item was left blank by mistake. In addition, 
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average age of our sample was 44.17, 91% of our sample were male and 82.2% of the 
sample had at least an undergraduate degree. To assess whether non-response bias is an 
issue in our sample, we first compared the responses of early and late respondents by using 
a multivariate general linear model test. The assumption in this analysis is that late 
respondents are closer to the non-responding group than the early respondents (Rogelberg 
& Stanton, 2007). There were no significant differences in any of the variables measured 
for early and late respondents. In addition, we compared the level of education of our 
survey respondents with the whole population (i.e., all InnoCentive solvers), and this also 
showed no important differences, suggesting that non-response bias is not a major concern 
for our sample. 
Measures
Reward size. This construct is measured by the monetary amount offered for a 
particular challenge. We extracted this information from the company archives. Because 
the data was highly skewed we used logarithmic transformation of this variable (e.g., Gong 
et al., 2009).
Prosocial motivation. We measured prosocial motivation with a three-item scale (Į =
.88) which we adapted from Grant and Sumanth (2009). We modified the items, based on 
the in-depth interviews with solvers and analysis of the online content, in such a way that 
they addressed the specific prosocial reasons for participation in the InnoCentive 
innovation challenges. Respondents rated the extent to which the respective scale items 
corresponded to the reason for their engagement in the InnoCentive challenge (that was 
specified in the invitation email). Response scale ranged from 1 “does not correspond at 
all” to 7 “corresponds exactly”. The items are the following: “Opportunity to benefit others 
through my solution”, “Opportunity to work on something that matters”, “Opportunity to 
work on ‘real life’ problems”.
challenges that have more than one award, video challenges (creating a video for InnoCentive) and grand 
challenges (i.e., offering one million dollar or more) were excluded from the analysis since they were 
significantly different from the other challenges (i.e. content, requirement, awarding structure) and since 
they were exceptionally low in number. Excluding these cases did not change the results of our hypotheses 
testing. 
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Creative self-efficacy. We measured creative self-efficacy with a three-item scale (Į =
.85) which we adapted from the creative self-efficacy scale of Tierney and Farmer (2002)
based on the in-depth interviews with solvers and analysis of the online content. The items 
were adapted so that they addressed solvers’ beliefs in their ability to be successful in the 
creative activity of solving innovation problems in InnoCentive. One of the items 
addressed solvers’ perceived level of competence in solving the innovation problem, and 
the response scale ranged from 1 “not competent at all” to 7 “very competent”. The other 
two items addressed their confidence about generating the best solution to the innovation 
problem and winning the award, rated on a scale of 1 “no chance at all” to 7 “certain”.
Creative engagement. In order to measure creative engagement, we used the time spent 
on developing a creative solution – a commonly used indicator of amount of cognitive 
resources expended in a task (Yeo & Neal, 2004). We asked solvers to report the total
number of hours they spent on two aspects of creative engagement: searching for the 
solution (thinking, reading, researching and discussing ideas with others) and writing up 
the solution. These two items address different facets of creative engagement discussed in 
the prior literature. Searching for the solution item taps into the creative acts of 
information searching and idea generation (Zhang & Bartol, 2010) whereas writing up the 
solution item taps into the creative acts of clarifying the reasoning for the ideas and 
communicating it to others (Drazin et al., 1999). We used log transformation of these two 
items due to high skewness. We then created a composite score of creative engagement by 
averaging these two items (Į = .79)2. It is also worth noting that this measure excludes 
non-creative acts because, in our context, solvers are not required to engage in routine 
tasks as would be the case in traditional organizational settings.    
Control variables. From the in-depth interviews, analysis of the online content and 
prior research, we identified three other motivational orientations for participation in
InnoCentive challenges: intrinsic, extrinsic (i.e., recognition and career) and learning 
motivation (i.e., motivation to learn new things and develop skills). We controlled for these 
2 We tested whether our results are robust to alternative operationalization of creative engagement. To that 
end, we have re-ran our tests by calculating creative engagement as (1) log transforming sum of the two 
items (2) log transforming mean of the two items, (3) log transforming items and using as separate 
dependent variables. None of the operationalization changed the results of our hypothesis testing. The 
results of these analyses are available from the first author on request. 
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motivational orientations because they typically influence creativity (Gong et al., 2009; 
Shalley et al., 2004). Items of intrinsic, extrinsic and learning motivation were adapted 
from the literature (Baer et al., 2003; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 
1999) in the light of the motivations that were revealed in the in-depth interviews and 
content analysis. The same question and scale anchors of the prosocial motivation scale 
were used for measuring these motivational orientations. Intrinsic motivation was 
measured with a four item scale (Į = .86); a sample item is following: “Enjoyment of 
solving problems”. Extrinsic motivation addressed the non-monetary sources of extrinsic 
motivation (i.e., recognition and career prospects) and was tapped with four items (Į =
.89), a sample item being: “Recognition I will receive after solving the problem”. Learning 
motivation consisted of four items (Į = .92); a sample item was: “Learning new things”. 
We also controlled for the level of complexity as it can influence motivations, the 
reward-creativity relationship and the time needed to solve a given problem (Baer et al., 
2003). We used a dummy variable to control for the challenge type (i.e., “Theoretical” or 
“Reduction-to-Practice”) since the requirement for physical evidence in “Reduction-to-
Practice” challenges brings more complexity to the creation of final submissions3. 
Moreover, we controlled for perceived competition by asking solvers to rate the level of 
competition because that can influence motivation, engagement and creativity (Boudreau 
et al., 2011; Shalley & Oldham, 1997). The item was anchored as 1 “very weak 
competition” to 7 “very intense competition”. In addition, our in-depth interviews 
suggested that constructs relating to prior knowledge can influence motivation, 
engagement level and perception of rewards. Therefore, to account for the possibility that 
observed effects may be partly attributable to knowledge-related variables, we controlled 
for whether someone already knew the solution by using a dummy variable. In addition, 
we used a seven-point item to assess the distance of the challenge discipline from solvers’ 
field of expertise which was anchored as 1 “inside my field of expertise” and 7 “outside 
my field of expertise” (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Moreover, we controlled for solvers’ 
education level by asking the highest academic degree earned (six levels ranging from 
3 We also measured perceived complexity by asking solvers to rate the extent of complexity of the challenge 
on a seven-point scale anchored as 1 “not complex at all” to 7 “very complex”.  As using this subjective 
measure of complexity did not affect the results of our hypotheses testing, we preferred to use the objective 
measure. 
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“less than a high school degree” to “PhD degree”). Following previous creativity research 
(e.g., Gong et al., 2009), we also controlled for demographic variables of age and gender. 
We measured gender by using a dummy variable coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. 
Age was measured in years and is reported by the solvers using an open question. We also 
controlled for income level by asking annual income in U.S. dollars (eight levels ranging 
from “0 to 25,000” to “more than 500,000”) because level of income might influence the 
perceived value of the rewards.  
Preliminary Analyses
Means, standard deviations, sample size and correlations are presented in Table 1. In 
order to see whether the items of creative self-efficacy, prosocial, intrinsic, learning and 
extrinsic motivation are related to their proposed constructs and whether these constructs 
are distinct, we first conducted an exploratory factor analysis. We entered all items for 
measuring motivation into the analysis, with principal axis factoring, varimax rotation and 
Kaiser normalization. As expected, five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged. 
All items showed clear loadings on their respective construct (see appendix Table A2). As 
a supplementary analysis to assess discriminant validity, we conducted confirmatory factor 
analysis using LISREL software (see appendix Table A3). The results indicated that the 
expected 5-factor solution provided an excellent fit with the data (Ȥ2= 549.12, SRMR = .04, 
GFI = .91, CFI = .97). In addition, this solution provided a considerably better fit than the 
alternative nested models (for 4-factor solution where prosocial and learning motivation 
were loaded on the same factor, Ȥ2 = 1451.18, SRMR = .08, GFI = .80, CFI = .92; for 3-
factor solution where intrinsic, prosocial and learning motivation were loaded on the same 
factor, Ȥ2= 2063.84, SRMR= .08, GFI=.73 CFI=.89; for 2-factor solution where all 
motivational orientations were loaded on the same factor Ȥ2 = 3398.00, SRMR= .13, 
GFI=.63 CFI=.81;  for single factor solution Ȥ2 = 4323.20, SRMR = .15 GFI = .57, CFI = 
.75). Chi-square difference tests also showed that our expected model had a significantly 
better fit than the alternatives. These results confirmed that intrinsic, prosocial, learning, 
extrinsic motivation and creative self-efficacy constructs are distinct. In addition, we 
checked the variance inflation factors to determine whether substantial correlations 
between motivational orientation constructs are problematic for our analysis. The highest
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variance inflation factor was 2.29 (well below the recommended threshold of 10), 
suggesting that multicollinearity was not a problem for our analysis.
Moderation Analyses
We started testing our hypotheses by using hierarchical ordinary least squares 
regression analyses and followed the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991) for 
moderated regression analysis. To create an interaction term, we mean-centered prosocial 
motivation and reward size variables and multiplied them. We entered all control variables 
in the first step, prosocial motivation and reward size variables in the second step, and the 
interaction of prosocial motivation and reward variables in the third step. Results are 
reported in Table 2. With respect to our first hypothesis about the moderating role of 
prosocial motivation on the reward size-creative engagement link, it is worth noting that 
reward size was a significant, independent predictor of creative engagement while 
prosocial motivation was not (see Model 5; ȕ = .09, p < .05; ȕ = -.06, p = .26, 
respectively). As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the interaction effect of reward size and 
prosocial motivation on creative engagement was significant (see Model 6; ȕ = -.13, p <
.01). 
To facilitate the interpretation of this interaction, we plotted simple slopes showing the 
relationship between reward size and creative engagement at one standard deviation below 
and above the mean of prosocial motivation (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 2 depicts the 
simple slopes. Statistical testing of the simple slopes revealed that when prosocial 
motivation was low, reward size significantly predicted higher creative engagement (ȕ =
.56, p < .001). When prosocial motivation was high, however, the slope was negative but 
not significant (ȕ = -.09, p = .43). Post-hoc analysis suggested that reward size was 
significantly associated with lower creative engagement when the level of prosocial 
motivation was at least 1.42 standard deviations above the mean. 
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FIGURE 2
Study 1: Simple Slopes for Creative Engagement
 
Mediation Analyses
To test whether creative self-efficacy mediated the moderating effect of prosocial 
motivation, we followed the moderated causal steps approach (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005) and bootstrap procedures (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hayes, 2013). Muller and his 
colleagues (2005) suggested that in order for a moderation to be mediated, three conditions 
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effect on the dependent variable; and last, bringing the mediator into the equation should 
reduce the magnitude of direct effect of the interaction variable on the dependent variable. 
Table 3 demonstrates that the interaction of prosocial motivation with reward size 
significantly influenced both creative self-efficacy (see Model 3; ȕ = -.11, p < .01) and
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to Model 6 (from ȕ = -.13 to ȕ= -.11). Taken together, the three conditions suggested by 
Muller and his colleagues (2005) were met, confirming Hypothesis 3. 
We complemented our mediation analyses by testing the statistical significance of the 
indirect effects of the reward size and prosocial motivation interaction through creative 
self-efficacy. We followed bootstrap procedures to construct bias-corrected confidence 
intervals on the basis of 5,000 random samples with replacement from the full sample 
(Hayes, 2013; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Mediation occurs if an indirect effect differs 
significantly from zero. In support of our Hypothesis 3, the 95 % confidence intervals for 
the indirect effect of the interaction through creative self-efficacy excluded zero (-0.69, -
0.003), which suggested that creative self-efficacy mediated the moderating effect of 
prosocial motivation on the reward-creative engagement link. 
In addition, we tested whether intrinsic motivation also mediated the moderating effect 
of prosocial motivation by following the same procedures above. We first ran a regression 
analysis using intrinsic motivation as the dependent variable (not reported here) which 
showed that the interaction of prosocial motivation with reward size was significant in 
influencing intrinsic motivation (ȕ = .08, p < .05); however, as shown in Table 3, intrinsic 
motivation did not have a significant effect on creative engagement (see Model 6; ȕ = .04, 
p = .47). It also did not affect the magnitude of the interaction effect of prosocial 
motivation and reward size on creative engagement when entered into the model after the 
interaction in a separate analysis (not reported here). Moreover, the 95% confidence 
interval for indirect effects of the interaction term through intrinsic motivation included 
zero (-0.002, 0.03). Finally, the 95% confidence intervals remained similar when we 
entered intrinsic motivation and creative self-efficacy simultaneously into the 
bootstrapping analyses (95% CI for creative self-efficacy [-0.65, -0.003]; 95% CI for 
intrinsic motivation [-0.003, 0.02]). Taken together, these analyses suggested that intrinsic 
motivation did not mediate the moderating effect of prosocial motivation in the reward-
creative engagement link, but that creative self-efficacy did. 
To provide a complete overview of motivational antecedents of creativity, it is worth 
reporting simple relations between other motivational orientations and creative 
engagement. The results showed that non-monetary sources of extrinsic motivation (i.e., 
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recognition and career prospects) had a significantly positive effect on creative 
engagement (See Model 5; ȕ = .20 p < .001) while learning motivation did not have a 
significant effect on creative engagement (See Model 5; ȕ = -.07, p = .24).
To conclude, these results confirmed that prosocial motivation moderates the 
relationship between rewards and creative engagement, and creative self-efficacy mediates 
this interaction effect. However, although in-depth interviews and content analysis 
minimized potential omitted variable bias by allowing us to control for relevant variables, 
there was still a possibility of this bias. In addition, our research design was cross-sectional 
which limited our ability to derive conclusions about causality. We addressed these 
limitations by conducting a laboratory experiment.
STUDY 2
We complemented our field study with a laboratory experiment for several reasons. 
First, we aimed to test our mediated moderation hypothesis for creative performance (i.e., 
Hypotheses 2 and 4). Second, we wanted to strengthen causal inferences, and rule out 
omitted variable bias and alternative explanations by randomly assigning participants to 
different prosocial motivation and monetary reward conditions  (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
Third, to strengthen the validity and generalizability of our results, we wanted to 
constructively replicate our findings by using different measures of creative self-efficacy, 
creative engagement and intrinsic motivation (Lykken, 1968). 
Sample, Design and Procedures
The participants were 81 full-time undergraduate students at a large university who 
volunteered to take part in an experiment in exchange for course credits. The average age 
of participants was 19.9 years and 58 % of them were male. We used a two-by-two (2 x 2) 
between-participants factorial design (prosocial motivation: control, prosocial by reward 
size: low, high). Participants who arrived at the laboratory were told that we were 
interested in seeing how they generated ideas. They were then escorted to separate 
experimental cubicles. Once they were seated in the cubicle, we assigned each participant 
randomly to one of the experimental conditions. The cubicles were completely isolated and 
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participants were not able to see or hear each other. Each participant had a computer, a 
table, and a chair in his or her cubicle. 
Experimental task. Participants completed an idea-generation task which is common in 
experimental studies focusing on creativity (e.g., Baer, Leenders, Oldham, & Vadera, 
2010; Grant & Berry, 2011). In an attempt to enhance external validity, the task was 
adapted from a real challenge in InnoCentive. They were given the following task:
How can drivers interact with existing devices with minimum distraction from the primary task 
of driving and focusing on the road?  Please submit your idea(s) for drivers to interact with 
existing devices (cell phones, tablet, music player, GPS etc.) without compromising their ability 
to drive and pay attention to the road. For example, your ideas could be about new devices, 
accessories or mobile apps that facilitate interaction with the existing devices. It can also be 
about novel ways of interaction with these devices. 
Prosocial motivation manipulation. In order to manipulate prosocial motivation, we 
provided information that emphasized the needs of others and potential benefits to others 
(e.g., Grant & Berry, 2011). Specifically, the information highlighted the importance for 
other people of safe driving and the suffering that was caused by distracted drivers. By 
providing some details about the damages and costs to other people, the goal was to create 
an empathetic concern for others and trigger a motivational state to benefit others. The 
following text was used to manipulate prosocial motivation: 
Safe driving is a major concern for our society, since road traffic accidents are shown to be one 
of the top 10 leading causes of death which kills over a million people every year. In addition, 
every year, 50 million people suffer from car accident injuries, including permanent disabilities. 
Economic costs of those accidents are estimated to be over 500 billion Euros. A large portion of 
those accidents is caused by distracted drivers.
Reward manipulation. After participants had been assigned to one of the prosocial
motivation conditions, the manipulation of monetary rewards took place. For the low-
reward and high-reward conditions, participants were informed that they stood a chance of 
winning 50 or 500 Euros respectively. We decided on these amounts based on our review 
of the actual rewards offered in online idea-generation contests for students. For example, 
NASA Tournament Lab offered prizes ranging from 100 to 500 Euros for an idea-
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generation contest (finding compelling ways to illustrate and demonstrate the depth and 
potential of their “Planetary Data System” database) for students while Battle of Concept 
(a Dutch crowdsourcing platform for students) offers rewards ranging between 50-350
Euros in most of their “brainstorm” contests (e.g., new product/service ideas). Before the 
experiment, we also interviewed 12 students (from the same university from which the 
participants were recruited) and confirmed with them that the reward amounts were 
realistic. Promising a certain amount of monetary reward before the experimental task 
takes place is a way of manipulating rewards that has commonly been used in previous 
experimental research (e.g., Amabile et al., 1986; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001). We used 
the following message for the manipulation by changing the amount of reward for the 
respective group (i.e., 50 for the low-reward and 500 for the high-reward condition):
There will be a monetary award for the best idea on this idea generation task. If you create the 
best idea for this problem you will be awarded with 50/500 Euros!
Measures
Creative self-efficacy. We assessed creative self-efficacy with three items adapted from 
Schmidt and DeShon (2010) which addressed the efficacy feelings about creative 
performance in the idea generation task. We asked participants to assess their chances of, 
on a scale from 0% to 100%, “Having the best idea”, “Having one of the top 3 best ideas”, 
“Having one of the top 10 best ideas” (Į = .94) before they started writing their ideas. 
Creative engagement. We measured creative engagement with three items adapted 
from Brown and Leigh (1996) so that they specifically addressed the intensity of the 
engagement for the idea-generation task. Because the task was a purely creative activity 
and did not require routine activities, we believe this is an appropriate measure of creative 
engagement. The scale contained the following items: “I worked at my full capacity while 
generating ideas during the task”, “I tried as hard as I can to generate a good idea”, and “I 
really exerted myself to the fullest for generating a good idea” (Į = .90). 
Creative performance. We used expert ratings to assess the creative performance of 
participants’ ideas in line with the recent experimental studies (e.g., Baer et al., 2010; 
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Grant & Berry, 2011). In total, we had three experts. One of the raters was a senior user 
experience researcher at TomTom – an international company that provides navigation and 
location-based products and services for cars. Another was a project manager who helps 
companies to incorporate advanced analytics into mobile devices (this manager had 
extensive experience in the automotive industry). The last was an expert in marketing 
(with extensive experience of new product and service development). The raters were blind 
to the identity of the participants, to one another, and to the purpose and conditions of the 
experiment. The only information that we offered to raters was a spreadsheet of the 
participants’ ideas and the details of the experimental task. Similar to previous studies 
(e.g., Amabile, 1996), we explicitly defined creative ideas as those that are both novel and 
useful. We asked the raters to assess the ideas on a scale ranging from 1 “not at all 
creative” to 7 “very creative” (e.g., Grant & Berry, 2011). We examined the level of 
agreement across judges by calculating intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). The three 
raters achieved good reliability (ICC2 = .67, p < .001) which justifies averaging the 
individual ratings of experts into a composite score of creativity for each participant’s idea 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2008). 
Manipulation checks and intrinsic motivation. In order to ensure that the prosocial 
motivation manipulation was effective, we asked participants to complete a prosocial 
motivation scale, adapted from the scale devised by Grant (2008). The four items were 
adapted in such a way that specifically addressed experimental task: “I care about 
benefiting others through my idea(s)” “I want to help reducing the traffic accidents” “I 
want to have a positive impact on road safety” and “It is important to me to do good for 
others” (Į = .80). As for the observable and concrete variables, it is relatively simple to 
assume manipulations will work as intended (Perdue & Summers, 1986). Therefore, 
following the prior research that experimentally manipulated reward size via instructions 
(e.g., Amabile et al., 1986; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001), we did not include a self-
reported measure for checking reward size manipulation. 
We measured intrinsic motivation (in order to test whether it mediates the hypothesized 
interaction effects) with four items adapted from Grant (2008). Participants rated their 
level of agreement, on a scale of 1 to 7, for the reasons why they were motivated to engage 
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in the idea generation task: “I enjoy the idea generation task”, “Idea generation is fun”, “I 
find the idea generation task engaging”, “I enjoy generating ideas” (Į = .85).
Preliminary Analyses 
Means and standard deviations by experimental condition are shown in Table 3
(correlations are presented in Table A4). In order to assess whether our prosocial 
motivation manipulation worked as expected, we conducted an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the manipulation check measure of prosocial motivation. Only prosocial 
motivation had a main effect on the self-reported prosocial motivation scale (i.e. 
participants who received prosocial motivation manipulation reported higher prosocial 
motivation than those who did not) (F[1, 77] = 8.53, p < .01). There was no main effect of 
the amount of monetary reward, (F[1, 77] = .61, p = .44) nor the interaction (F[1, 77] = 
.96, p = .33) on the self-reported prosocial motivation. These results suggested that our 
manipulation of prosocial motivation was successful.  
TABLE 3
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations by Experimental Conditionsa
Condition
Creative Self-
Efficacy
Creative 
Engagement
Creative 
Performance
Control, Low Reward 
(n=20)
28.82 (21.98) 3.87 (1.22) 2.38 (.62)
Control, High Reward 
(n=20)
37.67 (30.59) 4.67 (1.23) 2.88 (1.00)
Prosocial, Low Reward 
(n=20)
54.90 (26.54) 5.25 (.97) 2.82 (1.01)
Prosocial, High Reward 
(n=21)
31.78 (20.50) 4.83 (1.28) 2.46 (1.02)
a Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Moderation Analyses
In order to assess the moderating role of prosocial motivation in the reward-creative 
engagement and reward-creative performance links, we started our analysis by conducting 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using creative engagement and creative
performance as dependent variables. The effect of prosocial motivation manipulation on 
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creative engagement was significant (F[1, 77] = 8.60, p < .01) while it was not significant 
for reward size (F[1, 77] = .51, p = .48).  As predicted in Hypothesis 1, we found a 
significant interaction effect of prosocial motivation and reward size on creative 
engagement (F[1, 77] = 5.42, p < .05). Figure 3 depicts this interaction effect. In order to 
interpret the interaction better, we examined the simple main effect of reward size on 
creative engagement in control and prosocial conditions. In the control condition, reward 
size had a positive effect on creative engagement (F[1, 77] = 4.57, p < .05). In the 
prosocial condition, however, reward size had a negative effect on creative engagement but 
the mean difference was not significant (F[1, 77] = 1.32, p = .25). 
With respect to creative performance, the results of the MANOVA analysis revealed 
that the effect of prosocial motivation manipulation on creative performance was not 
significant (F[1, 77] = .00, p = .98), nor was the effect of reward size (F[1, 77] = .12, p =
.73). The interaction effect of prosocial motivation and reward size on creative 
performance was significant (F[1, 77] = 4.29, p < .05) which confirms our Hypothesis 2. 
To facilitate the interpretation of this interaction, we examined the simple main effect of 
reward size on creative performance in control and prosocial conditions. Figure 4 shows 
the graphical representation of this interaction. In the control condition the difference 
between high and low reward conditions was positive and marginally significant (F[1, 77] 
= 2,89, p < .10), whereas this difference was negative, but not significant, in the prosocial 
condition (F[1, 77] = 1.51, p = .22). Taken together, these findings suggested that the 
prosocial motivation level of participants was a moderator of the effects of reward size on 
creative engagement and creative performance.
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FIGURE 3
Study 2: Results for Creative Engagement
FIGURE 4
Study 2: Results for Creativity
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Mediation Analyses
We assessed whether creative self-efficacy mediated the moderating effect of prosocial 
motivation on creative engagement by following a moderated causal step approach (Muller 
et al., 2005) and bootstrapping procedures (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hayes, 2013), as 
we did in the field study. We first conducted an ANOVA analysis by using creative self-
efficacy as the dependent variable and we found a significant interaction effect of prosocial 
motivation and reward size on creative self-efficacy (F[1, 77] = 8.17, p < .01). To test for 
the remaining conditions for mediated moderation, we conducted a hierarchical regression 
analysis (see Table 4). Model 2 in this table shows that interaction effect of prosocial 
motivation and reward size on creative engagement was significant (ȕ = -.43, p < .05). 
Model 3 in Table 4 indicates that creative self-efficacy had a significant positive effect on 
creative engagement (ȕ = .28, p < .05). When we entered creative self-efficacy in the 
Model 3, however, the interactive effect of the reward size and prosocial motivation 
manipulations decreased in magnitude (from ȕ = -.43 to ȕ = -.28) and to non-significance. 
Taken together, these results suggested that creative self-efficacy mediated the interaction 
effect of prosocial motivation and reward size on creative engagement (Muller et al., 
2005), supporting Hypothesis 3. To assess the significance of the indirect effects of the 
interaction on creative engagement through creative self-efficacy, we used bootstrap 
procedures to construct bias-corrected confidence intervals based on 5,000 random 
samples with replacement from the full sample (Hayes, 2013; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In 
support of Hypothesis 3, we found that the estimate of the confidence interval for indirect 
effect of the interaction through creative self-efficacy was negative and significant, the 
interval excluding zero (95% CI [-1.04, -0.06]). 
To assess whether creative self-efficacy also mediated the moderating effect of 
prosocial motivation on creative performance, we followed the same procedures described 
above. Our results showed that the interaction effect of prosocial motivation and reward 
size on creative performance was significant (See Model 5 in Table 4; ȕ = -.40, p < .05) 
and also showed the positive effect of creative self-efficacy on creative performance (See 
Model 6 in Table 4; ȕ = .24, p < .05). When we entered creative self-efficacy, the 
interactive effect of the reward size and prosocial motivation manipulations decreased in 
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magnitude (from ȕ = -.40 to ȕ = -.28) and to non-significance. Thus the conditions for 
mediated moderation were met (Muller et al., 2005). The estimate of the bias-corrected 
confidence interval for indirect effects of the interaction on creative performance through 
creative self-efficacy was also negative and significant, not including zero (95% CI [-0.79, 
-0.03]). These findings suggested that creative self-efficacy also mediated the interaction 
effect of prosocial motivation and reward size on creative performance, supporting 
Hypothesis 4. 
TABLE 4
Study 2: Results of Mediated Moderation Analysisa
Creative Engagement Creative Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variables ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE
Prosocial motivation .30** .27 .55*** .37 .41** .39 .00 .21 .23 .29 .08 .31
Reward size .07 .27 .32* .37 .27† .36 .04 .21 .27† .29 .18 .29
Reward size x 
prosocial motivation -.43* .53 -.28 .54 -.40* .41 -.28 .43
Creative self-efficacy .28* .01 .24* .00
R2 .10 .16 .22 .00 .05 .10
F 4.24 4.80 5.47 .05 1.47 2.14
ǻ52 .10* .06** .07* .00 .05* .05*
a Values are standardized coefficients.
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
In addition, we tested whether intrinsic motivation also mediated the interaction effect 
of prosocial motivation and reward size on creative engagement and performance. To that 
end, we first assessed whether the interaction of prosocial motivation and reward size had a 
significant effect on intrinsic motivation by conducting an ANOVA analysis that used 
intrinsic motivation as the dependent variable. The results for the interaction was not 
significant (F[1, 77] = .50, p = .48), failing to meet the first condition of a mediated 
moderation (Muller et al., 2005) The results of the bootstrapping analysis also suggested 
that intrinsic motivation did not mediate the interaction effect: that is, bias-corrected 
confidence intervals for indirect effect of the interaction effect on creative engagement and 
creative performance through intrinsic motivation included zero (95% CI [-0.56, 0.12]; [-
0.30, 0.05], respectively). Finally, the results of the regression analyses and bootstrap test 
remained similar when we entered intrinsic motivation and creative self-efficacy 
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simultaneously into our analysis4. Taken together, these analyses suggested that intrinsic 
motivation was not a mediator of the moderating effect of prosocial motivation in the 
reward-creative engagement link, but creative self-efficacy was. 
As a whole, the results of the experiment were parallel to the field study and provided 
causal evidence for the moderating role of prosocial motivation in the reward-creative 
engagement and reward-creative performance relationships. It also demonstrated that 
creative self-efficacy was a mediating mechanism of these interaction effects on creativity, 
even after we had controlled for intrinsic motivation. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Theoretical Contributions
The primary contribution of our study is that it identifies an important boundary 
condition for the relationship between rewards and creativity. Prior research mainly drew 
on either goal-setting or self-determination theories to explain the effects of rewards on 
creativity and provided contradictory recommendations on the reward-creativity link 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Shalley et al., 2004). Drawing on recent literature on the 
psychological consequences of money (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008), we develop a theory that 
suggests that the size of the reward will have varying effects on people’s creativity, 
depending on their individual level of prosocial motivation. We thereby provide a 
theoretical framework for reconciling the contradictory perspectives of goal-setting and 
self-determination theories in relation to the reward-creativity link. More specifically, we 
demonstrate that increased rewards have a positive effect on creativity for people with low 
prosocial motivation; however, this effect is diminished when the levels of prosocial 
4 Specifically, both the significance levels and the pattern of the results remained same when we used 
creative engagement as the dependent variable. With respect to creative performance, the pattern of the 
results remained similar as well; however, the significance levels relating to the mediating role of creative 
self-efficacy was reduced. That is, creative self-efficacy still had a positive effect on creative performance 
when intrinsic motivation was entered into the model where creative self-efficacy was the only mediator 
(i.e., Model 6 in Table 5), but this effect was marginDOO\VLJQLILFDQWȕ S7KHHIIHFWRILQWULQVLF
PRWLYDWLRQ ZDV QRW VLJQLILFDQW LQ WKLV PRGHO ȕ    S    7KLV ZDV DOVR WKH FDVH IRU ERRWVWUDS
analyses. 90% bias corrected confidence intervals for indirect effects of the interaction through excluded 
zero for creative self-efficacy (-0.63, -0.02) while including zero for intrinsic motivation (-0.24, 0.03); 
however the 95% confidence intervals for these indirect effects included zero for both variables. 
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motivation are higher. Studies have recently begun to identify moderators of the reward-
creativity relationship that are related to characteristics of the task (e.g., task complexity), 
the rewards (e.g., reward contingency, choice of which reward to select), or the 
information accompanying rewards (e.g., performance feedback or creativity training) 
(Baer et al., 2003; Burroughs, Dahl, Moreau, Chattopadhyay, & Gorn, 2011; Byron & 
Khazanchi, 2012). However, little research has focused on the personal factors that can 
drive individuals to respond to the same rewards differently (for an exception, see Baer et 
al. [2003]). 
Our study introduces creative self-efficacy as a mediating mechanism for explaining 
the interactive effects of rewards and prosocial motivation on creativity. In other words, 
individuals’ different responses to rewards depending on their prosocial motivation level 
will first affect how efficacious they feel in the creative task, and this will in turn influence 
how long and how intensively they engage in the creative activities of idea generation. It 
will also influence how novel and useful the ensuing ideas will be. Prior research has often 
considered intrinsic motivation to be the main mediating mechanism in the reward-
creativity relationship (Amabile, 1996; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), and has often 
overlooked the possibility that other motivational processes may explain internal mediating 
processes of creativity (Shalley et al., 2004; Zhou & Shalley, 2003). Our study thus 
challenges the common assumption in the creativity literature that rewards will affect 
creativity only through intrinsic motivation. Including both intrinsic motivation and 
creative self-efficacy in our empirical model, we demonstrate that creative self-efficacy 
can mediate the interaction effect of rewards and prosocial motivation on creativity while 
intrinsic motivation may fail to do so. On a broader level, this finding addresses the call to 
identify alternative mechanisms (to intrinsic motivation) that mediate between social-
contextual factors (including rewards) and creativity because empirical findings on the 
mediating role of intrinsic motivation are inconsistent and scarce (George, 2007; Shalley et 
al., 2004). Taking into account recent studies which provide empirical evidence for the 
mediating role of creative self-efficacy between social-contextual factors and creativity, 
such as transformational leadership (Gong et al., 2009) or supervisor expectations (Tierney 
& Farmer, 2011), it is reasonable to expect that creative self-efficacy might also be an 
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essential mediating mechanism in explaining motivational processes between the context 
and creative outcomes.   
We also contribute to the emerging research that focuses on motivational interactions in 
order to understand the motivational processes of creativity. Prior research showed that 
prosocial and intrinsic motivation interact in influencing creativity (Grant & Berry, 2011); 
however, the effects of other motivational interactions remained unexplored (George, 
2007). Our study addresses this gap by demonstrating the interactive effect of an extrinsic 
source of motivation (i.e., monetary rewards) and prosocial motivation in determining 
creative engagement and performance. The nature of the interaction between extrinsic and 
prosocial motivation is quite different from the one between intrinsic and prosocial 
motivation. To elaborate, the prosocial-intrinsic motivation interaction is synergistic: 
prosocial and intrinsic motivations interact in such a way that they enhance each other’s 
influence on creativity. In contrast, prosocial and extrinsic motivations interact in a 
substitutive way: an increase in either one of them diminishes the effect of the other on 
creativity. By demonstrating this unexplored interaction between prosocial and extrinsic 
motivation, we contribute to a better understanding of motivational mechanisms of 
creativity and address the calls to investigate how different motivations interact to affect 
creativity (Amabile, 1996; George, 2007). 
Our field study also has several distinct implications for a more comprehensive 
understanding of motivational antecedents of creativity. First, we found that certain 
sources of extrinsic motivation (i.e., gaining recognition and career prospects) are 
associated with greater creative engagement. Although a sizeable stream of literature links 
extrinsic motivation with lower creativity (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), this finding 
demonstrates that some sources of extrinsic motivation can actually stimulate creativity. 
Second, our findings reveal that learning motivation  has no significant effect on creative 
engagement with the problem at hand. This finding is different from that of a recent 
temporally-lagged field study by Gong, Huang and Farh (2009) which found a positive 
effect of learning motivation on creative self-efficacy and creativity. However, our study 
confirms the findings of an experimental study by Redmond, Mumford and Teach (1993)
who documented non-significant effects of learning motivation on creativity. Taken 
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together, this experimental study and our finding imply that learning motivation is not 
likely to enhance creative self-efficacy and creativity for the task at hand. One explanation 
is that learning motivation is likely to enhance creative self-efficacy and creativity over 
time since individuals need time to be able to explore and utilize the knowledge acquired 
(Gong et al., 2009). In addition, from a methodological standpoint, our field study 
improves upon prior field studies, which used perceptual measures of rewards, by using an 
objective measure of reward size. 
Finally, an important contribution of this paper is that, in the field study, we address the 
current innovation practices in organizations that are focused on harnessing the creative 
potential of people worldwide by means of the Internet – crowdsourcing (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012). Crowdsourcing is an emerging channel for open innovation and offers an immense 
potential for organizational innovativeness and problem-solving effectiveness (Boudreau 
& Lakhani, 2013)., Scholars have therefore emphasized the importance of understanding 
the dynamics of crowdsourcing (Lampel et al., 2012). Although prior research expanded 
our knowledge by examining the role of problem characteristics (e.g., modularity), 
information technology, competition, prior experience and expertise in crowdsourcing 
platforms (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Bayus, 2013; Boudreau et al., 2011; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 
2010), research on motivations and rewards in crowdsourcing is limited. We contribute to 
the innovation literature by identifying the reasons for participating, and exploring the 
effects of different motivations and reward size on engagement in crowdsourcing 
platforms. In addition, we challenge the assumption commonly made in the analytical 
models of crowdsourcing that increased monetary prizes will enhance the efforts made by 
those who contribute ideas to crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). The 
results of our field study demonstrate that the effects of monetary rewards are not uniform 
(i.e., it depends on the level of prosocial motivation) in crowdsourcing platforms and 
suggest that we need to take a more nuanced perspective when designing such platforms. 
As a whole, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of 
crowdsourcing. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
These contributions should be interpreted in the light of this study’s limitations. First, 
we did not test directly how increased monetary rewards are perceived (i.e., controlling or 
informational), depending on the level of prosocial motivation. Future research could 
conduct such direct tests and look in more detail at how people’s perceptions of monetary 
rewards change with respect to changes in their level of prosocial motivation. Second, we 
did not have access to creative performance data for the ideas generated in the field study. 
This is because InnoCentive promises to keep seekers anonymous; we could not therefore 
contact seeker organizations to rate the creativity of the ideas. As an alternative, we 
considered using expert ratings of creativity; however, due to intellectual property rights 
(i.e., either the solver or seeker owns the rights to an idea), InnoCentive was not allowed to 
share the individual ideas with us. Furthermore, the monetary rewards in our field study 
and experiment were presented in the form of a tournament (i.e., the most creative idea is 
rewarded) and involved certain sizes. Although our theoretical reasoning does not rely on 
the structure or specific amount of the monetary rewards, it will be interesting to see 
whether this relationship will hold for different reward structures and amounts. For 
example, to ensure the generalizability of these findings, future research might test how the 
proposed relationships unfold when rewards are given for exceeding a certain level of 
creative performance or when different sizes of monetary reward are used. Importantly, 
several factors, such as who gives the money, why it is given and the way it is given, can 
also influence the symbolic meanings associated with the money (Mickel & Barron, 2008). 
Researchers could address how these symbolic meanings might influence the perceptions 
associated with monetary rewards and the link between rewards and creativity. Finally, it is 
also of importance to examine whether our findings can be extended to non-monetary 
sources of rewards such as verbal rewards (e.g., positive feedback), and rewards with 
different contingencies such as those that are not contingent on the qualities of the creative 
outcome (e.g., engagement-contingent or completion-contingent rewards).
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Practical Implications
Our study offers important practical implications for organizations as it contributes to a 
better understanding of creativity – a key ingredient of organizational innovation. The core 
insight provided by this study is that managers should be careful about using monetary 
rewards to stimulate creativity as it can backfire, or at best be non-effective, for people 
with high prosocial motivation. Given that prosocial motivation is one of the important 
motivations for engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors that include creative 
activities such as idea generation or innovative suggestions (Grant & Ashford, 2008; 
Unsworth, 2001), managers must carefully assess the nature of the task and people’s likely 
motivation before using monetary rewards. If they do so, they can use monetary resources 
more effectively to stimulate creativity.  
The implications of our study go beyond intra-organizational management of creativity; 
we provide implications for the management of creativity outside the boundaries of the 
organization via crowdsourcing.  Decisions on the size of monetary rewards are critical in 
most of the crowdsourcing platforms in driving engagement by the crowd. Our findings, 
for example, suggest that high monetary rewards should not be used when the prosocial 
aspects of the innovation problem are highly salient. We also suggest providing 
opportunities for recognition and career benefits in order to stimulate greater engagement 
by the crowd. Moreover, our findings imply that providing information cues that will 
enhance creative self-efficacy judgments of the crowd, such as positive feedback (e.g., Gist 
& Mitchell, 1992), are important in driving creativity in crowdsourcing platforms. As a 
whole, our study provides important implications for harnessing the creativity of the crowd 
– something which offers great potential for solving challenging scientific problems in 
various disciplines and for improving organizational innovativeness (Boudreau & Lakhani, 
2013; Lakhani et al., 2013; Munos, 2009). 
Finally, more effective management of prosocial motivation, creativity and money can 
only benefit our society. Mismanaging such resources would be wasting three valuable 
assets: human potential to benefit others, creative energies and money. Thus, we encourage 
managers of both profit and non-profit organizations to evaluate carefully both the context 
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and people before using money as a stimulus for more creative engagement and 
performance.
Conclusion
By triangulating data from a field study and an experiment, we introduce prosocial 
motivation as a moderator that determines the effects of rewards on people’s creativity. We 
demonstrate that reward size will enhance creative engagement and performance when 
individuals have low prosocial motivation; however, this effect is diminished when levels 
of prosocial motivation are higher. We also show that this interaction effect is mediated by 
feelings of creative self-efficacy. We hope that these findings will set the stage for further 
theoretical progress towards a better understanding of the complex motivational processes 
of creativity. 
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Qualitative Data Sources
Data Source Interviews Netnography
InnoCentive Employees 13 
Solver Interviews 10
InnoCentive Blog Posts 358 posts
InnoCentive Forum Posts 77 posts
LinkedIn Group Posts and Comments 193 posts
TABLE A2
Study 1: Results of Exploratory Factor Analysisa
Item
Prosocial 
Motivation 
Į 
Creative 
Self-Efficacy 
Į 
Intrinsic 
Motivation 
Į 
Learning 
Motivation 
Į 
Extrinsic 
Motivation 
Į 
Opportunity to benefit others through my 
solution .81
Opportunity to work on something matters .85
Opportunity to work on real life problems .82
Confidence in having the best solution .92
Confidence in winning the reward .89
Competence in solving the problem .80
Enjoyment of creating new things .79
Enjoyment of solving problems .82
Enjoyment of working in the field of 
challenge .68
Intellectual curiosity .74
Learning new things .81
Enhancing my skills .85
Sharpening my brain .82
Being updated with science .78
Improving my resume .85
Enhancing my career prospects .87
Recognition of solving the problem .85
Showing my competences .79
a Exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization. All components eigenvalue is over 
1 and five factor structures explain 78% of variance. All factor loadings that are greater than .35 are presented in 
the table. 
48 
66
   Chapter 2 
TABLE A3
Study 1: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Main Model and 
Alternative Models
Models Ȥ RMSEA SRMR GFI NFI CFI IFI
5 factors 549.12 .07 .04 .91 .96 .97 .97
4 factors(cse, Intrinsic, prosocial 
self combined, extrinsic) 1451.18 .13 .08 .80 .91 .92 .92
3 factors (CSE, Intrinsic, prosocial 
and self combined vs extrinsic) 2063.84 .15 .08 .73 .89 .89 .89
2 factors (CSE, others combined) 3398.00 .20 .13 .63 .81 .81 .81
Single Factor 4323.20 .22 .15 .57 .74 .75 .75
TABLE A4
Study 2: Correlation Matrixa
1 2 3 4
1. Prosocial motivation
2. Reward size .01
3. Creative self-efficacy .19 -.14
4. Creative engagement .31 .08 .36
5. Creativity .00 .04 .27 .29
                               aCorrelations equal to or greater than .27 are significant at p < .05.  
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Chapter 3
UNPACKING THE KNOWLEDGE MECHANISMS 
OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN 
CROWDSOURCING: THE INTERPLAY OF 
EXPERTISE AND KNOWLEDGE SEARCH
INTRODUCTION
apability in solving problems is critical for organizational success and 
innovativeness since the main function of most innovation projects is problem 
solving (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; von Hippel, 1990). Therefore, researchers 
extensively studied the factors influencing problem solving effectiveness. One of the most 
important topics, in this respect, is the role of various knowledge related phenomena on 
problem solving (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Prior 
research addressed the role of knowledge on problem solving mainly by investigating the 
effect of expertise on problem solving; however, research in this area has divergent 
conclusions (Dane, 2010). More specifically, some scholars suggest that expertise is 
crucial for creative problem solving (e.g., Amabile 1996, Larkin et al. 1980, Weisberg 
2006), whereas others claim expertise is associated with inflexibility (e.g., Chi, 2006; 
Lewandowsky, Little, & Kalish, 2007) and a constraining factor for problem solving (e.g., 
Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Stacey, Eckert, & Wiley, 2002; Wiley, 1998). 
As expertise is characterized by a high level of knowledge on a specific domain 
(Ericsson, 2006; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986), these arguments often hold the 
C
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assumption that experts merely use the knowledge domain(s) in which they have expertise. 
This assumption, however, might fall short in explaining complex mechanisms of 
knowledge usage since experts could differ in their tendency to rely on their expertise and 
can search for knowledge in different domains outside their area of expertise. In effect, a 
relatively recent line of research focuses on the effects of knowledge search processes on 
the innovative performance of individuals (e.g. Fleming, 2001; Schilling & Green, 2011)
and organizations (e.g., Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006). These studies 
focused on how knowledge search breadth and depth influence the final innovative 
performance of individuals and organizations. Although, these studies expanded our 
understanding on the influence of knowledge on creative performance, the research on 
knowledge search often merely focused on the effect of knowledge search while neglecting 
the perspective that expertise and prior knowledge bring for the individual who conducts 
knowledge search. This is crucial since expertise has certain consequences for individuals 
in terms of recognition, evaluation and utilization of the information that will be gathered 
from knowledge search (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
The core premise of this paper is that problem solving performance is an outcome of an 
individual’s expertise and specific behaviors he/she engages in when searching a solution. 
To that end, we integrate psychology literature on the effects of expertise on problem 
solving and management literature on the knowledge search-innovation link. We start with 
the acknowledgement that expertise will be required for thoroughly understanding a 
technical and complex innovation problem but it might lead to cognitive inflexibility that 
might limit finding creative solutions to the problem. We argue that to the extent the search 
behavior overcomes the cognitive inflexibilities associated with expertise, it will contribute 
to a better quality solution for that problem. When experts go outside the domain of their 
expertise in their knowledge search, by diversifying the knowledge pool for the solution, 
they will be more likely to perform better in solving complex innovation problems. 
Nevertheless, diversifying this pool too much will be detrimental for problem solving 
performance since recombining many different knowledge elements will induce high 
complexity and uncertainty in problem solving process which might be beyond the 
cognitive capacities of individuals and distract them from devoting necessary attention and 
effort required for problem solving.
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To capture these effects, in line with earlier literature, we differentiate between breadth 
and depth of knowledge search (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006; Schilling & Green, 2011). 
We further distinguish depth of search based on relatedness of the domain (Schilling, 
Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni, 2003), namely depth of search in same, related and 
different knowledge domains compared to the domain of the problem at hand. Analyzing, 
139 different innovation problems and 646 solutions developed for those problems, we 
found support for our hypotheses: expertise is associated with better problem solving 
performance when it is accompanied with a knowledge search behavior that is (1) high in 
overall breadth-low in depth for same domain, (2) high in overall breadth-high in depth for 
related domain and (3) high in overall breadth-low in depth for different domain. 
Our study has important theoretical implications for micro level knowledge and 
problem solving literatures. We shed light on the controversy around the expertise-
creativity link by showing this effect depends both on the specific knowledge search 
behavior conducted for solving a problem. Put differently, we suggest that expertise is an 
important contingency for the effectiveness of different knowledge search behaviors. 
Second, by distinguishing between knowledge search breadth and knowledge search depth 
based on the relatedness of a knowledge domain, we offer a comprehensive framework for 
the role of knowledge mechanisms for problem solving. Our framework incorporates 
expertise studies in psychology literature and knowledge search work in management 
literature which are related streams of research but often remained disparate.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Expertise and Problem Solving
Our aim in this paper is to shed light on the relationship between expertise and problem 
solving performance. Earlier research on expertise–problem solving relationship is limited 
and provides contradictory predictions (Dane, 2010). On the one hand, scholars highlight 
the positive effects of expertise by pointing to the requirement of deep knowledge on a 
certain domain for having a significant contribution to a domain (e.g., Amabile, 1983; 
Weisberg, 1999). On the other hand, scholars emphasize the cognitive inflexibilities in 
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seeing potential alternatives and stabilized cognitive schemas and suggest that expertise 
would hamper problem solving performance (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Luchins, 1942). 
Scholars emphasizing the benefits of expertise for problem solving mainly highlighted 
the advantages of “knowing the territory” and the importance of immersion in to a 
knowledge domain before contributing to it (Hayes, 1989; Weisberg, 1999). Expertise in a 
certain domain is highly important to recognize, evaluate and utilize new information in 
different domains (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In addition as experts have automatized 
habits and efficiency in the skills that knowledge domain requires, they might allocate 
more effort and attention to novel aspects of problem solving (Dane, 2010; Weisberg, 
1999).
Scholars emphasizing restrictiveness of expertise mainly highlighted the cognitive 
inflexibilities associated with expertise. One of the most widely noted argument is that 
expertise might cause problem solving fixation- which is the situation that the first idea
coming to mind, triggered by expertise in the domain, prevents the alternatives from being 
considered %LODOLü0F/HRG	*REHWDE/XFKLQV. Thus when fixation 
occurs, experts pre-engage in a certain solution and avoid considering alternative solutions. 
This is limiting for creativity in two ways. First, the idea is mainly triggered by earlier 
solutions developed in the expertise domain that is unlikely to be a creative solution itself. 
Second, it further blocks engagement in creative thinking. In addition to fixation, experts 
typically have stable domain schemas –“structures containing knowledge about a concept 
or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes”  
(Dane, 2010: 581). This stability is associated with resistance to modification, adaptation 
and cognitive inflexibility which generates an important barrier for problem solving (Dane, 
2010; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In summary, experts are engaged very strongly in a point of 
view or way of solving problems which inhibits consideration of alternative solutions and 
therefore diminishes performance in solving an innovation problem (Sternberg, 1996; 
Koestler, 1964; De Bono)
Interplay of Expertise and Knowledge Search Behavior 
Earlier research on expertise and problem solving, most often, either implicitly or 
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explicitly assumed that experts only and extensively use the knowledge they have expertise 
on. However, the effects of expertise might depend on tendency to rely on their expertise 
domain. In addition, when solving a problem one is not limited to use his/her knowledge in 
the area of expertise but can search and accumulate knowledge outside the expertise 
domain. Individuals have different approaches for searching a solution to a problem: some 
are more likely to incorporate more knowledge domains than the others (Hong & Page, 
2001, 2004; Runco, 1991). Nevertheless, prior studies often addressed the relationship 
between problem solving performance and expertise separately and neglected the possible 
differences in proclivity to rely on expertise domain and search behavior. This might 
explain the inconsistent results in the literature as, for example, inflexibility related 
problems are more likely to occur when an expert merely uses his/her knowledge in the 
expertise domain. Therefore, we aim to incorporate expertise and knowledge search 
behavior in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of knowledge mechanisms 
of problem solving. 
We argue effects of expertise on problem solving performance will depend on the 
search behavior that experts engage in and whether this behavior helps overcoming 
inflexibility related problems. To the extent, that the search behavior diversifies the 
knowledge base to draw on, search behavior will help overcoming cognitive flexibilities. 
This diversification should positively influence problem solving performance by increasing 
the conceptual elements for novel recombinations (e.g.,Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007; 
Schilling & Green, 2011), improving the chances for finding new information (Campbell, 
1960; Simonton, 1999a, 1999b), enhancing the chance of seeing unrelated links between 
different domains and transferring to the problem domain (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; 
Schilling, 2005), and stimulating a more creative mindset and thinking style that questions 
and doubts the current assumptions in the problem domain (e.g. Maitlis & Sonenshein, 
2010; Weisberg, 1999). Put differently, diversification is likely to overcome cognitive 
stability and inflexibility problem that experts encounter by increasing elements for 
recombination and for challenging the current stabilized cognitive structures and accessing 
alternative perspectives for analogical transfer.
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On the other hand, the benefits of diversification beyond a certain point can be above 
the cognitive capacity of a certain individual. In such a case diversification would not be 
beneficial. When the diversification increases too much, interactions between the 
components become highly complex combined with increased uncertainty associated with 
the outcomes (Fleming, 2001). Since individuals have limited cognitive capacity, they 
cannot comprehend and attend to different elements fully and they are unlikely to benefit 
from the diversification while solving problems. Over diversification is also likely to 
distract people in problem solving activity since devoted attention and mental energy is 
required for creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). In addition, such difficulties might cause 
stress which might, in turn, be a restraining factor for creative processes when the stress 
becomes overwhelming (Perry-Smith and Shalley, 2003).
Scholars typically distinguished between breadth and depth of knowledge search both 
in organizational (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006) and individual level (e.g., Schilling & 
Green, 2011). We extend this by further distinguishing depth of search by separately 
focusing on different domains. More specifically, we focus on the depth of search in 
different domains by comparing the domain in question based on its’ relatedness to the 
problem domain and classify domains as depth of search in same domain, depth of search
in related domain and depth of search in different domain (compared the domain of the 
problem at hand). We define depth of search in same domain as the intensity of knowledge 
usage in the problem domain. Depth of search in related domain addresses the intensity of 
knowledge usage the domains that are related to the problem domain (e.g. intensity of 
using biochemistry knowledge for a problem on organic chemistry). In other words, this 
construct concerns the intensity of knowledge domain in the boundaries of problem 
domain. In a similar vein, depth of search in different domain is defined as the intensity of 
knowledge usage in the domains that are different to the problem (e.g. using biology 
knowledge for solving a problem on organic chemistry). This construct addresses the 
intensity of search in the truly outside knowledge domains of the problem. 
Different combinations of knowledge search depth and breadth would bring different 
levels of cognitive diversification for experts and therefore, have different impact in terms 
of overcoming potential cognitive inflexibility related problems. We specifically 
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emphasize knowledge search breadth as it is typically considered as the major driver of 
diversification (e.g., Simonton, 1995, 1999a) and, thus, critical for cognitive flexibility of 
experts. Relative to search depth, we expect a broad search over various domains to be 
more instrumental in solving a problem for experts for two reasons. First, because broad 
knowledge search enables individuals to use varied knowledge from many different 
disciplines, it will generate a more diversified knowledge pool for tapping into while 
solving a problem compared to deeply searching in a certain domain. This is crucial for 
creative processes of problem solving as it creates the opportunity for generating unusual 
connections between different knowledge bases which might ultimately lead to fruitful 
synthesis of them (Simonton, 1995, 1999a, 1999b). Second, breadth of knowledge search 
would considerably increase the chances of finding an analogous problem and solution in a 
different domain and applying the solution to the current problem compared to deep search 
in a certain domain. This is because one would have more chances to be exposed to 
different kind of problems while searching broadly. This analogous transfer is one of the 
major mechanisms how insight for a successful and innovative solution occurs (e.g., 
Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). 
Therefore, a deep search in a certain knowledge domain, no matter how distant it is to 
domain of the problem, is likely to generate less cognitive diversification for experts than a 
broad search over different domains. To clarify, this is not to claim that searching deeply in 
another problem domain would not allow for diversification for experts but searching 
broadly would be more instrumental in this respect. Indeed, Schilling and Green (2011)
found that although both search depth and breadth significantly increase to chances of 
creating atypical connections, a major driver of creative solutions, search breadth is much 
more positively related to create such connections. All in all, we propose that a high level 
of knowledge search breadth is crucial for problem solving performance of experts. 
Combining this high search breadth with different depth of search in abovementioned 
three categories of knowledge domains (i.e., same, related and different) would have 
different impacts on diversification and overcoming cognitive flexibilities and, in turn, will 
determine the subsequent performance in solving an innovation problem. With respect 
search depth in same domain, we believe minimizing search depth would increase the 
chances of breaking the boundaries of a certain knowledge domain for experts and 
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overcome fixation effects,  which are critical for making a novel contribution to a domain 
%LODOLü HW DO D:HLVEHrg, 1999), since higher search depth might trigger them to 
remain in the domain of expertise, act in a habitual and automatized way and limit 
diversification and novel approaches to the problem %LODOLü HW DO D E. 
Therefore, we propose the combination high breadth of search with low depth of search in 
same domain would be more likely to be associated with higher problem solving 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1: Expertise is positively associated with problem solving performance 
when individuals combine expertise in the problem domain with high breadth of search 
and low depth of search in the problem domain.
Concerning the knowledge search depth in a different domain, when deeply searching 
in a very distant domain and searching broadly individuals might feel overwhelmed as 
such a recombination is likely to be beyond their cognitive capabilities. This is because 
incorporating the knowledge from a very different domain from the expertise field and 
broadly searching for solutions in different domains would require intense cognitive effort 
and attention while generating high uncertainty. Because over diversification causes high 
complexity and uncertainty in recombining different knowledge elements and distract 
people from devoting necessary energy on problem solving (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; 
Fleming, 2001), we expect a combination of high search breadth with low search depth in a 
different domain would be optimal for overcoming cognitive flexibilities without 
restraining creative processes. Therefore we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Expertise is positively associated with problem solving performance 
when individuals combine expertise in the problem domain with high breadth of search 
and low depth of search in a different domain from the problem domain.
Regarding the search depth in related knowledge domains, searching deeply for a 
solution in a related knowledge domain will further contribute to diversification that is 
brought by high search breadth and, thus, enhance the chances of experts to overcome their 
inflexibility. Combining both high intensity of related knowledge and high knowledge 
variation will jointly contribute to positive effects of expertise on problem solving 
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performance. We do not expect searching deeply in a related domain to increase 
complexity and uncertainty beyond cognitive capacities of experts as it is in the case of 
deep search in a different domain. The reason behind is that the distance between expertise 
domain and a related domain is much shorter than the distance between a different domain 
which would facilitate deeply searching in a related domain for experts. Therefore, we 
expect deep search in a related domain to further contribute to diversification that broad 
search brings as opposed to being restrictive in the case of deep search in a different 
domain. In addition, knowledge search breadth might also benefit related search depth in a 
way that increases the effectiveness of the decision on what knowledge domain to search 
deeply. That is, knowledge search breadth might also allow a well-targeted exploration in 
the appropriate related knowledge domain. Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 3: Expertise is positively associated with problem solving performance 
when individuals combine expertise in the problem domain with high breadth of search 
and high depth of search in a related domain to the problem domain.
METHODS
Research Setting and Data
InnoCentive is an intermediary company and offers a platform for matching innovation 
problems of its clients (i.e. seekers) with its community (i.e. solvers). Seekers share a 
specific problem (i.e. challenge) with InnoCentive and InnoCentive broadcasts this 
problem on its online platform. Almost 300.000 solvers self-select the challenges that they 
want to participate in and voluntarily submit their solutions by means of an elaborated 
report. The solutions are then rated by InnoCentive based on their quality and the winning 
solution is selected  and rewarded by the seeker. Typically, the winner receives a monetary 
reward ranging from 5.000-100.000 USD. As one of the executives in InnoCentive defines, 
“the challenges here are modules of work characterized by a specific problem statement”. 
Content wise, they are similar to R&D department work and, in effect, a large number of 
the challenges originate from R&D groups. Thus, typically, challenges are complex, 
expertise requiring and demanding tasks. 
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Our population consists of the all submissions of the active solvers (i.e. solvers who 
participate in challenges) between Dec 2009 (the date the challenges started to be rated by 
InnoCentive) and May 2012 in InnoCentive. We have collected data for Reduced to 
Practice challenges (i.e. the challenges that require detailed description of the solution and 
physical evidence that proves the solution will work) and Theoretical challenges (i.e. the 
challenges that require detailed descriptions, specifications and supporting precedents). 
There were two reasons for focusing on these two types of challenges. First, they were 
reflecting R&D work better than other challenges and, second, only the submissions to 
these challenges are rated based on their problem solving performance by InnoCentive. In 
total, we tested our hypotheses on the solutions to 139 different R&D challenges. 
We used a web based survey tool to collect data from the solvers of InnoCentive. The 
survey was in English. Using contact information from the company, we sent a customized 
e-mail (i.e. addressed the solver by his/her name and included specific challenge 
information that we requested information for), along with an URL survey link, to 3005 
solvers. The e-mail was clearly demonstrating that we are partnering with the company and 
that their response was very important for us. In addition to that, InnoCentive informed 
solvers, in its LinkedIn groups and blog, about our research and collaboration and 
announced that they might be receiving an email shortly. We sent a reminder a week after 
the initial contact by adopting a dynamic strategy (i.e. the time, day and text of the initial 
email was changed)  (Sauermann & Roach, 2012). We received 744 (24.8 %) responses. 
After excluding the cases with incomplete answers, 646 (21.2%) responses were usable for 
our analysis.
Measures
Expertise. Our expertise measure was derived from the marginality measure of 
Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010) and measured by the web survey. The item addressed the 
extent the challenge is in solvers’ field of expertise. It was anchored as 1 “inside my field 
of expertise”, 4 “at the boundary of my field of expertise”, 7 “outside my field of 
expertise”. 
Knowledge search breadth and depth. The knowledge search variables were measured 
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by the web survey. We have developed the items based on the literature and in-depth 
interviews with solvers and InnoCentive employees. The questions addressed two 
dimensions of knowledge search: depth of knowledge search in same, related and different 
domains and breadth of knowledge search for the solution. The questions are presented 
after elaborate definitions of what we mean with the same, related and different knowledge 
domains and are accompanied with clear examples explaining the relatedness and breadth 
in knowledge usage. We provided the following definitions for respondents. For the same 
domain: “The knowledge domain you use for solving the challenge and the discipline of the 
challenge falls into the same domain. An example is using your organic chemistry 
knowledge for a challenge on organic chemistry. For related domain: “The knowledge 
domain you use for solving the challenge and the discipline of the challenge are related. 
An example is using your biochemistry knowledge for a challenge on organic chemistry. 
For different domain: “Different domain is the knowledge domain you use for solving the 
challenge and the discipline of the challenge are different. An example is using your 
knowledge on biology for a challenge on organic chemistry”.
Before asking the questions for measuring depth of knowledge search variable, we first 
provided a text for introducing and reminding that knowledge search depth might vary for 
individuals: “Solvers might use different sources of knowledge, in different intensities, 
while developing their solutions”. We then asked respondents “to what extent did you use 
your knowledge in the following domains for solving the challenge”. The response scale 
was seven-point (1 “no use”, 4 “moderate use”, 7 “intense use”). It comprised three items 
addressing the intensity of usage for the same, related and different domains. It is similar to 
the measurement of “depth of knowledge” in the innovation literature (e.g. Laursen & 
Salter, 2006). For the breadth of knowledge search variable, we first provided an 
introductory text for pointing that search breadth might differ for individuals: “Solvers 
might solve the challenges by intensively using their knowledge on a single knowledge 
domain or by incorporating their knowledge on various domains.” We then asked “how 
many knowledge domain(s) did you use for your solution to the challenge?” which was 
adapted from Zahra and Covin (1993). The response scale was again seven-point (1 “single 
domain”, 4 “moderate variety of domains”, 7 “wide variety of domains”). 
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Problem solving performance. Problem solving performance is measured by the rating 
given for each submission by an “Innovation Program Manager” of InnoCentive. The 
rating varied from 1 to 5 and an increasing rating refers to a greater success in solving the 
innovation problem and addressing problem requirements defined by the seeker. 
Control variables. We controlled for solvers’ engagement in the search by measuring 
the hours solvers spent for searching solution to the challenge (Yeo & Neal, 2004). Due to 
high skewness, we used logarithmic transformation of this variable. Additionally, we 
controlled for four demographic variables that might influence motivations, effort and 
creativity: age, gender and education level. We measured gender as a dichotomous 
variable coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Age was measured in years and is reported 
by the solvers on an open question. The education measure addressed the highest academic 
degree earned and had 6 levels (ranging from less than high school degree to PhD degree). 
In order to account for challenge related differences we also controlled for challenge type
by using a dummy variable (i.e. theoretical challenge vs. reduced to practice challenge) of 
the challenge. The main difference between these two types of challenges were that 
physical evidence (e.g. prototype)  was required in RTP challenges in addition to the 
detailed descriptions that are required in theoretical challenges. In addition we collected 
data from the archives of the company for the award size in a challenge Because the data 
was highly skewed we used logarithmic transformation of this variable. Our in depth 
interviews revealed that in some cases solvers select the challenges that they already know 
the answer rather than randomly selecting a challenge and working on it. This could 
influence both effort and motives; thus we controlled for knowing the solution already by a 
dummy variable. 
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, sample size and correlations are presented in Table 5. We 
tested our hypotheses by using hierarchical ordinary least squares regression analyses 
following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). In the first step we entered the 
control variables; in the second step we added the expertise and knowledge search 
variables. In the last two steps, we entered the two-way and three-way interactions of
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expertise and knowledge search variables. To create the interaction terms, we standardized 
expertise and knowledge search variables and multiplied them. In order to address 
potential multicollinearity issues, we reviewed variance inflation factor values (VIFs) 
before creating the interaction terms (e.g., Shalley, Gilson, & Blum, 2009). VIF values for 
expertise and knowledge search variables ranged between 1.05 and 3.36 suggesting that  
multicollinearity was far from being an issue in our study (Hair, Black, William, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 1998).
TABLE 5
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlationsa
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Age 43.5 14.5
2. Education 3.66 1.26 .14
3. Female .09 0.29 -.08 .04
4. Challenge 
type
.17 0.38 -.01 .18 -.02
5. Knowing .22 0.42 .09 .04 .01 .04
6. Reward Size 4.39 0.25 .01 .14 .05 .50 .07
7. Engagement .65 0.51 -.07 .17 .02 .08 .00 .09
8. Expertise 3.97 1.89 .03 .10 -.05 .09 .09 .07 .16
9. Same search 
depth 
4.23 1.78 -.01 .09 .04 .02 .08 .07 .14 .34
10. Related 
search depth 
4.13 1.50 -.06 .08 -.01 -.05 -.02 .05 .15 .10 .34
11. Different 
search depth
3.76 1.73 -.02 -.04 -.08 -.02 -.01 .07 .02 -.09 -.03 .41
12. Search 
breadth
7.44 3.30 .05 -.09 -.07 -.05 -.04 .01 .09 -.16 -.02 .32 .52
13. Performance 2.59 1.12 -.07 .32 -.02 .09 .05 .01 .44 .20 .13 .11 -.08 -.13
a Reward size and engagement variables are log transformed. Correlations that are greater than .08 are significant 
at p < .05 
The results of the hierarchical regression analyses are displayed in Table 6. As 
hypothesized, the three-way interactions between expertise, breadth of search and depth of 
search were all significant. More specifically, the interaction between, expertise, breadth of 
search and depth of search in the same domain was negative and significant (ȕ = -.17, p <
.01). The interaction between, expertise, breadth of search and depth of search in the 
related domain was positive and significant (ȕ = .23, p < .01). Lastly, the interaction 
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between, expertise breadth of search and depth of search in the different domain was 
negative and significant (ȕ = -.14, p < .05). This provides initial support for our 
hypotheses. 
TABLE 6
Results of Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysesa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variablesb ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE
Age -.10* .00 -.09* .00 -.09* .00 -.08* .00
Education .28*** .04 .25*** .04 .25*** .04 .24*** .04
Gender -.03 .16 -.04 .15 -.04 .15 -.04 .16
Challenge type .05 .13 .05 .13 .05 .13 .04 .13
Knowing the solution .07 .11 .06 .11 .06 .11 .06 .11
Reward size -.08 .20 -.07 .20 -.07 .20 -.07 .20
Engagement .28*** .07 .27*** .07 .27*** .07 .27*** .07
Expertise .08* .05 .09* .05 .08† .05
Same search depth -.01 .05 -.02 .05 -.04 .06
Related search depth .07 .05 .08 .05 .13* .06
Different search depth -.05 .05 -.05 .05 -.05 .06
Search breadth -.13** .05 -.12** .05 -.11* .06
Expertise x search breadth .06 .05 .07 .05
Expertise x different search depth -.01 .05 -.05 .06
Expertise x related search depth -.03 .05 .10 .06
Expertise x same search depth -.04 .04 -.15** .06
Search breadth x same search depth -.09 .05 -.10* .05
Search breadth x related search 
depth
-.03 .05 -.00 .05
Search breadth x different search 
depth
.02 .05 .02 .05
Expertise x search breadth x same 
search depth
-.17** .05
Expertise x search breadth x related 
search depth
.23** .05
Expertise x search breadth x 
different search depth
-.14* .05
R2 .19 .22 .23 .25
F 17.80 12.48 8.21 7.91
ǻ52 .19*** .03*** .01 .02**
a Values are standardized coefficients. Reward size and engagement variables are log transformed.
† p < .10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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To facilitate the interpretation of this interaction, we plotted simple slopes depicting the 
relationship between expertise and creativity at one standard deviation below and above 
the mean of different breadth of search and depth of search variables. Figure 5-7 depicts 
these interactions for depth of search in same, related and different domain respectively. In 
Figure 1 simple slopes suggest that, as expected, expertise is most strongly related to 
problem solving performance when knowledge search breadth is high and knowledge 
search depth in the same domain is low. In other combinations of breadth of search and 
depth in same domain the effect of expertise seems to be slight. Figure 2 shows that, as 
predicted, expertise is most strongly related to problem solving performance when 
knowledge search breadth is high and knowledge search depth in the related domain is 
high. The effect of expertise in all other knowledge search breadth and depth in related 
domain were small. In Figure 3, slopes suggests that, as hypothesized, expertise is most 
strongly related to problem solving performance when knowledge search breadth is high 
and knowledge search depth in the different domain is low. This effect was minor in other 
search breadth and depth in different domain combinations.
FIGURE 5
Expertise and Problem Solving Performance Relationship in High/Low Breadth of 
Search and Depth of Search in the Same Domain
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FIGURE 6
Expertise and Problem Solving Performance Relationship in High/Low Breadth of
Search and Depth of Search in the Related Domain
FIGURE 7
Expertise and Problem Solving Performance Relationship in High/Low Breadth of
Search and Depth of Search in the Different Domain
To examine this interpretation statistically, we used the Dawson and Richter (2006)
slope difference test, which allowed us to examine whether the slopes for the relationship 
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between expertise and problem solving performance was statistically different in certain 
knowledge search breadth and depth combinations. The results are presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 Slope Difference Test for Same, Related and Different Search Depth
Different Depth Related Depth Same Depth
Pair of slopes
t-value for slope 
difference
t-value for slope 
difference
t-value for slope 
difference
(1) and (2) -1,97* 2,85** -3,28**
(1) and (3) -0,51 3,05** -0,99
(1) and (4) 0,39 2,78** -0,86
(2) and (3) 1,47 -0,59 3,04**
(2) and (4) 2,51* -0,98 3,08**
(3) and (4) 0,89 -0,34 -0,04
a (1) High breadth, high depth; (2) High breadth, low depth; (3) Low breadth, high depth; (4) Low breadth, low 
depth
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
They show that, as hypothesized, the slope for low same usage-high breadth was 
significantly more positive than each of the other three combinations (i.e., high same 
depth-low breadth, high same depth-high breadth and low same depth-low breadth) and 
these three slopes did not differ significantly from each other. Similarly, the slope for high 
related depth-high breadth was significantly more positive than each of the other three 
combinations (i.e., high related depth-low breadth, low related depth-high breadth and low 
related depth-low breadth) and these three slopes did not differ significantly from each 
other. The slope for low different depth- high breadth was significantly more positive then 
low different depth-low breadth and high different depth-high breadth but was not 
significantly different from high different depth-low breadth. 
To interpret these slopes further, we compare each of the simple slopes to zero which 
are shown in Table A4. The table demonstrates that expertise positively and significantly 
relates to problem solving performance when and search breadth is high and same domain 
knowledge depth is low (ȕ = 0.43, p < .001), when search breadth is high and related 
domain knowledge depth is high (ȕ = 0.42, p < .001) and search breadth is high and 
different domain knowledge depth is low (ȕ = 0.31, p < .01) which confirms our 
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 respectively. None of the other search depth and breadth 
combinations were significant. All in all, these results provide support for our hypotheses.
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Post-hoc Analyses
In an attempt to more clearly describe the optimal knowledge search mechanisms for 
people with different levels of expertise, we depicted how different combinations of search 
depth and breadth influence problem solving performance for people with low and high 
expertise5 (Figures 8-13). These figures aim to portray how an individual, depending on 
his/her expertise, should search for solutions in order to maximize his/her problem solving 
performance.
Figures 8-10 show the optimal search behavior for people with high expertise. For 
these people highest level of problem solving performance was achieved when (1) high 
level of search breadth was combined with low level of search depth in the same domain, 
(2) high level of search breadth was combined with high level of search depth in a related 
domain, and (3) high level of search breadth was combined with low level of search depth 
in a different domain. 
FIGURE 8
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Same Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with High Expertise
5 Solvers who are in high expertise group are the people who scored at least one standard deviation above the
mean of expertise. Solvers who are in low expertise group are the people who scored at least one standard 
deviation  below  the mean of expertise.
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FIGURE 9
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Related Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with High Expertise
FIGURE 10  
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Different Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with High Expertise
High Breadth
 Low Breadth
2,2
2,4
2,6
2,8
3
3,2
3,4
3,6
Low Related
High Related
P
ro
bl
em
 S
ol
vi
ng
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
3,4-3,6
3,2-3,4
3-3,2
2,8-3
2,6-2,8
2,4-2,6
2,2-2,4
High Breadth
LowBreadth
2,2
2,4
2,6
2,8
3
3,2
3,4
3,6
Low Different
High Different
P
ro
bl
em
 S
ol
vi
ng
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
3,4-3,6
3,2-3,4
3-3,2
2,8-3
2,6-2,8
2,4-2,6
2,2-2,4
69
87
Unpacking the Knowledge Mechanisms of Problem Solving in Crowdsourcing  
Figures 11-13 show the optimal search behavior for people with low expertise. For 
these people highest level of problem solving performance was achieved when (1) low 
level of search breadth was combined with high level of search depth in the same domain, 
(2) low level of search breadth was combined with high level of search depth in a related 
domain, and (3) low level of search breadth was combined with low level of search depth 
in a different domain. 
FIGURE 11
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Same Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with Low Expertise
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FIGURE 12
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Related Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with Low Expertise
FIGURE 13
Effects of Knowledge Search Breadth and Depth in Different Domain on Problem 
Solving Performance for People with Low Expertise
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications
In this study, we examined how the relationship between expertise and problem solving 
performance unfolds depending on knowledge search behavior. We found that expertise is 
positively related to problem solving performance: when it is accompanied with a broad 
search for solutions in other knowledge domains and (1) shallow (i.e., low depth of search) 
in the domain of problem or (2) shallow search outside the knowledge domain of the 
problem or (3) deep search in the boundaries of the domain of the problem (i.e., in a 
related domain). The main contribution of this finding is shedding light on the equivocal 
findings on the expertise- problem solving performance link as we show when expertise is 
more likely to contribute performance when combined with certain search behaviors in 
solving innovation problems. By doing so, we incorporate expertise research in psychology 
literature and knowledge search research in management literature which often remained 
separate. This extends understanding of and offers a comprehensive framework for 
knowledge mechanisms of problem solving. 
Another important contribution of our study is that we address the recent shift of locus 
towards using crowdsourcing practices for organizational problem solving (Afuah & 
Tucci, 2012; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008): Organizations recently started to tap into the diverse 
knowledge pool all over the world thanks to the advances in communication technologies 
and the Internet. This would also contribute to literature on open innovation. Although this 
literature widely researched the role of external sources, such as customers (e.g., von 
Hippel, 1976), suppliers (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995), competitors (e.g., Allen, 1983)
or universities (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006), we know little about crowdsourcing 
platforms for innovation –an emerging channel for open innovation with huge potential 
(for exceptions see Boudreau et al., 2011; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Terwiesch & Xu, 
2008). We, thus, extend extant open innovation and problem solving literature by showing 
how expertise and problem solving performance relationship unfolds when the locus of 
innovation and problem solving is outside the organizational boundaries. 
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In addition to the main contributions explained above, our study contributes to the 
discussion about the relation of breadth and depth of solution search. Consistent with the 
recent views, our results show that search breadth and depth are not necessarily two ends 
of a continuum but are independent constructs that are often positively correlated (e.g., 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Schilling & Green, 2011). We further contribute to this discussion 
by distinguishing search depth in different knowledge domains using the problem domain 
as the reference point. The nature of correlation between these constructs of search depth 
and breadth was different suggesting that a more fine-grained and detailed analysis of 
search depth and breadth indeed has merits. To elaborate, only correlations between search 
breadth and search depth in certain domains, namely different and related knowledge 
domains, were positive. Also, search depth in a related domain was positively correlated 
with search depth in both different and same domains but these latter two domains were 
not correlated with each other. In other words, individuals can search both more deeply 
and more broadly but these interactions between them are more complex than what the 
literature found before.  
Our results indicated negative main effect of search breadth on problem solving 
performance. This finding suggests that appropriate combination of search breadth with 
expertise and search depth is crucial for problem solving. In other words, when a broad 
search for solutions is not complemented with appropriate search depth and expertise, it 
would be detrimental in solving innovation problems. One explanation is that when 
searching very broadly individuals might stray from the problem and knowledge required 
for solving it unless this search is accompanied with appropriate utilization of prior and 
new knowledge that are relevant for the problem. In addition, our results show a marginal 
positive main effect of expertise on problem solving performance. This suggests that prior 
knowledge in the problem domain and perspective that expertise brings is important in 
problem solving performance. In this respect, it is also important to recall the nature of the 
problems in our context: these are not simple problems that merely require creativity but 
they are knowledge-intensive, complex technical problems. Perhaps, the role of expertise 
might be less in more simple problems. Also, the results indicate a marginal positive main 
effect of search depth in related domain on problem solving performance. One explanation 
to that finding is that search in related domain might bring diversification and novel 
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perspective for the problem domain (compared to search depth in same domain) but do not 
bring too much difficulties for integrating knowledge to domain of the problem (compared 
to search depth in different domain).    
A clear strength of this study is our unique dataset of innovation problems. This allows 
a fine-grained analysis of the knowledge mechanisms of problem solving as focusing on 
the proposed relationships in a certain problem offers certain strengths over focusing on 
this link in the long-term. First, it offers a certain opportunity by providing clear reference 
point for the assessment of expertise and knowledge search variables. Second, it allows 
linking knowledge related constructs directly to real-time evaluations of creative 
performance in specific problems. This assessment of creative performance also has 
certain advantages over widely used supervisor ratings of creative performance in the 
literature. For example, supervisor ratings largely depend on supervisors’ capability to 
observe, evaluate and recall the creative performance of employees in a long period of time 
and might be overly influenced by recent performances. Moreover, supervisory ratings are 
prone to biases that are driven by politics, impression management practices of employees, 
affective cues or halo effects (Grant & Berry, 2011) which is a minor concern for our 
measurement as the personal relationships between the rater of the creativity and the 
solvers are very limited. The assessment of knowledge search variables and performance 
ratings from different sources also allowed us to overcome the concerns of common 
method bias. We also applied relevant procedural remedies in the questionnaire design (i.e. 
avoiding common scale anchors in the different constructs and providing definitions and 
clear examples to avoid item ambiguity) for the self-assessed constructs by following the 
suggestions of Podsakoff, and his colleagues (2003). 
Practical Implications
The main practical implication of this study is that experts can be more effective in 
solving complex innovation problems experts by searching knowledge beyond their 
domain of expertise. Therefore, they might proactively expose themselves to various 
knowledge domains and broaden their search while exploring a solution to a problem. 
They can also participate in various activities that are not-related to expertise area in order 
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to create diverse pool of knowledge to utilize when solving a problem. Managers can also 
encourage their employees to take part in various activities such as workshops, seminars or 
conferences on different knowledge domains. They can also provide free working time 
where employees can work on projects that are outside their area of expertise and main 
responsibility. In addition, managers can also provide project teams with specific 
instructions on how to search for a solution: broaden their search in general, be shallower 
in using knowledge in same and different domains as well as utilizing the related 
knowledge domains extensively. In a similar vein, managers of crowdsourcing platforms 
can also encourage/instruct experts in their platforms to engage in a similar knowledge 
search behavior. Moreover, organizations that struggle with solving innovation problems, 
even after encouraging diverse search behaviors, can harness crowdsourcing platforms 
where experts and non-experts in search for solutions in various ways which increases the 
chances of  finding the right people with right expertise and search behavior for effectively 
solving innovation problems
Future Research and Limitations
As in all studies this is study is not without limitations. The findings and contributions 
of this study must be interpreted in the light of these limitations. Using self-assessed 
expertise and knowledge search measures has its’ own advantages and disadvantages. One 
might question the accurateness of the assessment of expertise and relatedness of domains 
in the search depth measures as this requires evaluation of the distance between the domain 
of the problems and solvers’ respective fields of expertise and other search domains. 
Although, this is a fair concern, the high education level of solvers (i.e., 32 % have PhD 
degree and almost 80% have at least Bachelor’s degree) and considerable time and effort 
spent in solving the problem, this might be a less of an issue (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). 
Self-assessment of search behavior might also be considered as a limitation, however, it 
has the benefit of having greater likelihood of tapping into the full spectrum of knowledge 
reservoir for generating a solution, for instance, compared to studies that use citation 
measures of knowledge search (Fleming, 2001; Schilling & Green, 2011). 
Another point that needs to be taken into account is the process by which these 
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problems are decided to be posted in InnoCentive: Generally firms try to solve these 
problems internally and spent significant prior effort unsuccessfully before sending it out 
to InnoCentive. As those employees in the R&D departments are likely to be experts in the 
problem domain, searching outside the domain might be particularly important for these 
problems. Also, the problems here are knowledge intensive and complex problems, and 
generalization of our results to other types of problems must be made with caution. We 
encourage future research to examine different types of problems in different contexts to 
assess generalizability of our findings. 
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APPENDIX
TABLE A5
Test of Simple Slopes for Knowledge Search Combinations
Slope t value
High Breadth Low Same Domain Depth 0,43 4,01***
High Breadth High Same Domain Depth -0,11 -0,96
High Breadth Low Related Domain Depth -0,10 -0,80
High Breadth High Related Domain Depth 0,42 3,81***
High Breadth Low Different  Domain Depth 0,31 2,55**
High Breadth High Different Domain Depth 0,01 0,07
Low Breadth Low Same Domain Depth 0,02 0,20
Low Breadth High Same Domain Depth 0,01 0,18
Low Breadth Low Related Domain Depth 0,04 0,43
Low Breadth High Related Domain Depth 0,00 -0,03
Low Breadth Low Different  Domain Depth -0,04 -0,48
Low Breadth High Different Domain Depth 0,07 0,68
Values in bold are relevant to test of hypotheses.
** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Chapter 4
KNOWLEDGE DISCLOSURE IN 
CROWDSOURCING: DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIFFERENCES, TRUST AND FEAR OF 
OPPORTUNISM
INTRODUCTION
he Internet and advances in communication technologies have provided 
unprecedented opportunities for accessing and incorporating diverse knowledge all 
over the world. Researchers have emphasized the importance of creating a global 
pool of knowledge not only for organizational innovation problems but also for 
overwhelming challenges humanity faces in the 21st century, such as developing energy 
sources that do not contribute to climate warming (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Chan, 
Kirsop, & Arunachalam, 2011; Fedoroff, 2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Malone & 
Klein, 2007). One effective means of bringing together important knowledge from across 
the world are online crowdsourcing contests that are global in scope. These contests have 
remarkable potential in solving challenging problems in various disciplines, such as 
breakthroughs in the discovery and development of new drugs or ways of dealing with the 
challenges of big data in the biological sciences (Lakhani et al., 2013; Masum et al., 2013; 
Munos, 2009). 
Knowledge disclosure is a necessary condition for the utilization of knowledge in 
crowdsourcing contests (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Murray & O’Mahony, 2007). In 
T
79
97
Knowledge Disclosure in Crowdsourcing 
thisrespect, Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow highlights the paradoxical nature of 
knowledge disclosure: the value of knowledge can only be determined after one has the 
knowledge, but then the receiver of the knowledge acquires it without any cost (Arrow, 
1962). The purchaser then might act opportunistically and misappropriate the information, 
which will in turn make the inventor fearful of disclosing knowledge. This fear of 
opportunism is a major barrier to disclosure of knowledge (Anton & Yao, 2002; Arrow, 
1962). However, our understanding of fear of opportunism in crowdsourcing contests is 
limited. Although prior research has extended our understanding by focusing on the role of 
expertise, competition and incentives in prize contests (Boudreau et al., 2011; Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010; Murray, Stern, Campbell, & MacCormack, 2012; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), 
to the best of our knowledge, no prior empirical study has focused on participants’ fear of 
opportunism in such contests. A better understanding of, and a specific focus on, the fears 
of prize contest participants in relation to knowledge disclosure is of great importance 
because the knowledge created and disclosed by this group of people has great potential in 
overcoming important scientific challenges and improving organizational innovativeness 
(e.g., Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Lakhani et al., 2013)
In this project, our main aim is to contribute to a deeper and more fine-grained 
understanding of the fear of opportunism among the individuals who actively participate in 
prize contests. More specifically, we question whether the people who generate and 
disclose solutions in these contests are a specific population of individuals who do not 
experience fear of opportunism when disclosing their knowledge or whether they disclose 
their knowledge despite experiencing fear of opportunism. In addition, we explore whether 
these fears are the same among different individuals and demographic groups. In 
particular, we focus on gender and age differences since they influence important 
behaviors and outcomes such as motivation, risk taking and competitive behavior (Costa, 
Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004; 
Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011). Age and gender differences in certain personality traits is 
also well documented in the psychology literature (e.g. Feingold, 1994; Roberts & 
DelVecchio, 2000). Since such differences involve a variation in perceptions, emotions, 
motivations, behaviors, personality traits, they have a potential to influence the perceived
risks in knowledge sharing. The core premise of our paper is that older people and women 
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will have less fear of opportunism for disclosing knowledge. The underlying reason is that 
older people have better emotional regulation and would be more concerned with 
benefiting others rather than satisfying self-interested motives (Carstensen, Pasupathi, 
Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004) and therefore they will experience 
less fear for disclosing knowledge. Similarly, women will experience less fear of 
opportunism since they are more inclined to believe in the good intentions of others (Costa 
et al., 2001; Feingold, 1994).
We aim to further shed light on the gender and age differences on fear of opportunism 
by investigating trust to the intermediary organization as a potential psychological process
that might underly the gender and age effects on fear of opportunism. Prior research 
identified trust as a central factor in alleviating perceptions related to relational risks such 
as opportunistic behavior (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Woolthuis, 2005) and treated trust and fear of 
opportunism as distinct constructs (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Jap & Anderson, 2003; 
e.g., Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Trust is a broad concept which refers to “one's expectations, 
assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that another's future actions will be beneficial”
(Robinson, 1996: 576), Opportunism, on the other hand, is more specific and refers to “a
deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit promises about one's appropriate or 
required role behavior” (John, 1984: 279). As suggested by Jap and Anderson (2003) and 
in the definitions above, trust is a meta concept which has many facets and levels as 
opposed to fear of opportunism which is more behavioral and delimited in nature. In 
addition to this conceptual distinction between trust and fear of opportunism, we further 
distinguished trust and opportunism by operationalizing them as expectations towards
different parties. More specifically, we focused on trust towards the intermediary 
organization and fear of opportunism from the seeker organization. We argue that trust to 
the intermediary is more central and relevant than trust to the seeker organization (i.e. the 
beneficiary of the knowledge) in our context for two main reasons. First, the identity of the 
seeker organization is typically unknown to solvers whereas solvers typically know the 
identity of the intermediary and contact regularly with the intermediary. Therefore, 
developing a trusting relationship with the beneficiaries is unlikely if not impossible. 
Second, the intermediary organization has a key role in knowledge exchanges as its’ ability 
to mediate the interaction between parties in an unbiased and fair way is crucial. Thus, 
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trust to the intermediary is more relevant in mitigating relational risks in the context of 
crowdsourcing than trust to the seeker.   
Overall, our study contributes to the literature on crowdsourcing and knowledge 
disclosure in several ways. First, we take the first steps toward understanding the fear of 
opportunistic behavior in the emerging context of online crowdsourcing contests. Second, 
we identify demographic differences in how contest participants experience their fear of 
opportunism. Prior research acknowledged the importance of individual differences that 
might influence knowledge disclosure and highlighted the importance of abilities, 
motivational and affective states of people in sharing knowledge  (e.g., Gargiulo, Ertug, & 
Galunic, 2009; Levin, Kurtzberg, Phillips, & Lount, 2010; Reinholt, Pedersen, & Foss, 
2011). However, little research has focused on the possibility of demographic differences 
in factors that might influence knowledge sharing. By identifying gender and age 
differenence on fear of opportunism, our findings question the previous economics 
research on knowledge disclosure which has often considered fear of opportunism to be 
uniform among different individuals. In addition, we shed light on the underlying 
mechanism through which gender and age differences unfold. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
The emphasis of this paper is on building a better understanding of fear of opportunism 
in the context of crowdsourcing. Fear of opportunism can be defined as fears for potential 
opportunistic behavior of the seeker company (i.e., knowledge beneficiary) and it is an 
essential affective factor for knowledge disclosure because of the paradoxical nature of 
knowledge sharing (Arrow, 1962). That is, the value of knowledge can only be determined 
after having the knowledge, but then the purchaser of the knowledge acquires it without 
any cost. The purchaser, then, can act opportunistically and misappropriate the 
information, which will, in turn, make the inventor fearful of disclosing knowledge. This 
fear of opportunism is one of the main barriers of knowledge sharing (Anton & Yao, 2002; 
Arrow, 1962; Szulanski, 1996, 2003).
Prior research on knowledge sharing most often studied the effects of network 
characteristics such as network centrality, size or tie strength on knowledge sharing 
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(Anderson, 2008; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Tsai, 2001). More recently, scholars 
addressed knowledge sharing in a more fine-grained way and acknowledged that merely 
focusing on network position or ties are insufficient in explaining the knowledge sharing 
behavior. They highlighted the importance of individual factors and demonstrated that 
individuals may vary in their motivation to share knowledge and their ability to convey 
and absorb knowledge (Gagne, 2009; Gargiulo et al., 2009; Reinholt et al., 2011). Our 
study is in line with this recent research direction and examines how an important affective 
factor for knowledge sharing, fear of opportunism, might differ among different 
individuals. We specifically study how age and gender is related to the experience of such 
fears. We also investigate the role of trust as a potential mediating internal process between 
gender, age and fear of opportunism. 
Gender and Age Differences in Fear of Opportunism
In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of fear of opportunism, we 
examine demographic differences in such fears. Of the potential demographic differences, 
we specifically focus on gender and age differences because such differences are 
associated with variation in individuals’ emotions and behaviors (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 
2009; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004). 
We argue that age differences will be present in fear of opportunism. More specifically, 
older people will have less fear about potential opportunistic behaviors of knowledge 
receivers while disclosing their knowledge for two reasons. First, older people are likely to 
have better control and regulation of their emotions (Carstensen et al., 2011; Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 2004) and therefore would experience decreased level of negative emotions 
compared to younger people (Carstensen et al., 2000). Therefore, older people, by 
controlling and regulating concerns about opportunistic behavior of the knowledge 
receiver, would experience less fear of opportunism while sharing knowledge. Second, 
with aging people become more concerned for others and broader society rather being self-
concerned (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004). As the main cost of opportunistic behavior is not 
being able to gain monetary and reputational rewards, people with a less motivation toward 
such self-interested gains would be less worried about opportunistic behavior and would 
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still be satisfied as long as their knowledge benefits others. Therefore, since older people 
are less self-concerned, they would have less fear of opportunistic behavior. Taken 
together, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: Older people have less fear of opportunism in knowledge disclosure than 
younger people.
In addition to age differences, we expect gender differences in fear of opportunism in a 
way that women would experience less fear for sharing their knowledge. Personality 
studies investigating gender differences help us explain the reason why we expect gender 
differences in fear of opportunism. Several studies and meta-analyses examined the link 
between gender and certain personality traits and consistently found that women are more 
inclined to believe in the sincerity and good intentions of others (e.g., Costa et al., 2001; 
Feingold, 1994). Therefore, in a knowledge exchange, women would believe in the good 
intentions and sincerity of the knowledge receiver more compared to men. As a result of 
this, expectation of opportunistic behavior from the knowledge receiver would be to a 
lesser degree for women and, in turn, women will have less concern about their knowledge 
being used opportunistically. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Women have less fear of opportunism in knowledge disclosure than men.
The Mediating Role of Trust
In this paper, we propose trust as a mediating mechanism for the age and gender 
differences on fear of opportunism. Our proposition is based on the prior research which 
identified trust as a central mediating mechanism in knowledge and relational exchanges 
(e.g., Levin & Cross, 2004; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). It is worth clarifying that by trust, we 
refer to the trust of member of the crowdsourcing platform to the intermediary organization 
(i.e., owner of the platform). Presence of an intermediary organization is a central 
difference of the exchange in the tournament-based crowdsourcing context compared to 
exchanges in traditional contexts. We argue that trust to the seeker is unlikely to be 
relevant in our context as the identity of the seeker is not known (i.e., you cannot trust a 
party when identity of that party is completely anonymous). Although the presence of an 
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intermediary organization is not necessary for crowdsourcing platforms, it is particularly 
common in crowdsourcing practices that are in the form of a tournament (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). In such cases, parties of the exchange (i.e., creator and 
receiver of the knowledge) remain anonymous to each other. Only the intermediary 
organization has the knowledge about both parties and does not disclose the identity of the 
parties to each other. Thus, the intermediary has a central role in mediating the knowledge 
exchange between the parties in a fair and unbiased way which attaches great importance 
to the intermediary organization. Given this strong role of intermediary in ensuring the 
fairness of the knowledge exchange and anonymity of the seeker (knowledge receiver), we 
argue that trust to the intermediary organization might have a vital role in mediating the 
perceived relational risks that a solver (knowledge creator) experience.
We argue that women might trust more and, in turn, experience a lower level of fear of 
opportunism than men. This argument is based on extensive research which postulated
gender differences in relational orientation. This line of research posited and demonstrated
that women are more relationally oriented; that is, women are more inclined to describe 
themselves in terms of relationships with others and more likely to value being 
interdependent compared to men (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Cross & Madson, 1997; 
Pratt, Pancer, Hunsberger, & Manchester, 1990). Such a gender difference in relational 
orientation might also manifest itself in trust towards the other party of the relationship. 
That is, because women are more relationally oriented they might be more inclined to 
perceive a relationship more trustworthy compared to men.
In addition gender differences, we argue that older people might also trust more and, in 
turn, experience a lower level of fear of opportunism than younger people. We base our 
argument on the recent research highlighting “positivity effect” that aging brings – older 
individuals have relatively stronger focus on positive information than younger individuals
(Carstensen, 2006). We expect older people to focus on the information that will signal 
trustworthiness and in turn perceive the other party of the exchange more trustworthy. In 
fact, recent empirical research also found that older people are inclined to trust more than 
men since they differ in their judgments of trustworthiness (e.g., Castle et al., 2012).
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The link between trust and fear of opportunism is well established in the extant 
literature. The research on the inter-personal and inter-organizational trust consistently
highlighted the importance of trust in alleviating perceptions of relational risks in 
relationships (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Levin & Cross, 2004; McAllister, 1995; Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998; Woolthuis, 2005). As noted earlier, in the context of crowdsourcing contests, one of 
the most major relational risks related to knowledge disclosure is potential fear of 
opportunism. 
Taken together we propose:
Hypothesis 3: Trust to the intermediary organization mediates the relationship between 
age and fear of opportunism
Hypothesis 4: Trust to the intermediary organization mediates the relationship between 
gender and fear of opportunism
METHODS
Research Setting
In an attempt to understand fear of opportunism in crowdsourcing contests, we 
conducted our research with those contributing solutions on the InnoCentive online 
platform. InnoCentive applies crowdsourcing principles for solving innovation problems
by broadcasting prize-based innovation contests online and awarding financial prizes for 
the best solutions, typically ranging from 5,000 to 100,000 USD. InnoCentive is one of the 
best-known examples of how organizations can tap into a global knowledge pool and how 
people from all over the world and various scientific disciplines can solve challenging 
innovation problems. Researchers and science writers often highlight the potential of 
InnoCentive contests to overcome the scientific challenges we encounter and improve 
organizational innovativeness (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Munos, 2009; Sansom, 2011; 
Travis, 2008). Taken together, InnoCentive, with its global community of contributors and 
wide range of innovation problems, represents an excellent platform for studying fear of 
opportunism in crowdsourcing contests.
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Measures
Fear of opportunism. To measure the latent construct of fear of opportunism, we 
adapted a validated scale from prior research to our context (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). We 
modified this scale in such a way that it reflected specific fears of the contest participants 
in our context. For modifying the scale, we used the information we gathered from 23 in-
depth interviews that we conducted with contest participants in InnoCentive and 
employees of InnoCentive. More specifically, we interviewed contest participants who had 
won prizes multiple times, had won a prize once and had not won any prizes. Employees 
that we interviewed had extensive knowledge about contest participants and were from 
different organizational departments. All interviews were tape recorded. In the scale, we
used 7-point scale anchors measuring the extent of agreement which ranged from “totally 
disagree” to “totally agree”. We assessed fear of opportunism with three items. An 
example item is: “I think seekers will steal my ideas”. The internal consistency of the scale 
was high, with a Cronbach’s Į value of 0.88. If an item of the scale was not answered, we 
used remaining answered items to create an average score for fear of opportunism.
Gender and Age. In the survey, we asked participants to fill information on four 
demographic variables: age, gender, education and income level. We measured age in 
years, and it was reported in an open-ended question in our survey. Gender was measured 
by asking respondents to indicate whether they were male or female. 
Trust. This construct is measured by seven items using (Į = .87) which are developed 
based on the trust scale of Robinson (1996). An example item is: “I can expect 
InnoCentive to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion.”
Control variables. We controlled for other demographic variables, namely education 
and income level. Education level was assessed by the highest academic degree earned and 
had 6 levels ranging from “less than a high school degree” to “PhD degree”. For the 
income level variable, respondents were asked to report their annual income as within one 
of 8 ranges. The lowest income level was “0 to 25,000 USD” and the highest one was 
“more than 500,000 USD”.
87
105
Knowledge Disclosure in Crowdsourcing 
Sample and Procedures
We used a web-based survey tool to collect data from the solvers of InnoCentive. We 
focused on active solvers (i.e., solvers who participate in challenges) in InnoCentive. That 
is, we were not interested in solvers who just signed up or just read the challenge 
descriptions but never participated in the challenges. We believed that active solvers better 
represent the solver community in InnoCentive because in-depth interviews with 
InnoCentive employees revealed that the excluded group of solvers (i.e., solvers who have 
an account in InnoCentive but do not participate in challenges) includes many solvers who 
do not even visit the InnoCentive platform. More specifically, we focused on the entire 
population of solvers who participated in at least one Reduced to Practice (RTP) or 
Theoretical challenge between Dec 2009 and May 2012. RTP challenges refer to problems 
that require detailed description of the solution and physical evidence that proves the 
solution will work. Theoretical challenges refer to problems that require detailed 
descriptions, specifications and supporting precedents. 
Potential participants were invited via an email which described the purpose, procedure 
and anticipated benefits of the research. The email also explained institutional affiliations
of the researchers, anonymity of the responses and that the data will only be used for 
academic purposes. Participation to the survey was completely voluntary and the 
respondents did not have any dependencies to the researchers. Survey data were collected
only from those who agreed to proceed by clicking the survey link in the email. The entire 
survey was in English as the contest information in InnoCentive was broadcasted in 
English. In total, we sent a customized email to 3005 contest participants to invite them to 
participate in our survey. A reminder was sent a week after the initial contact. We received 
744 (24.8 %) responses, of which 630 (21.0%) were usable for further analyses (i.e., had 
answers for at least one construct of this study). We decided to keep the responses when 
questions for one or more constructs of our study were answered because we wanted to 
utilize the data that is usable in pairwise analyses of the constructs. The findings that are 
reported in the next section remained similar when we excluded the responses that are not 
entirely complete (i.e., cases that did not answer questions for one or more constructs of 
this study).  To assess whether the non-response bias was an important issue for our study, 
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we compared the answers of early and late respondents. The assumption in this analysis is 
that late respondents are closer to the non-responding group than the early respondents 
(Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). There were no significant differences between early and late 
respondents in any of the variables measured in this study. In addition, a previous survey 
conducted with InnoCentive contest participants reported that survey respondents did not 
have statistically significant differences from nonresponders in demographic 
characteristics such as gender distribution and ethnicity (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). 
Taken together, we do not expect non-response bias to be a serious concern for our study.
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, sample size and correlations are shown in Table 8. In order 
to assess discriminant validity, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 
software on our latent variables: trust and fear of opportunism. Table A5 (in appendix)
depicts the results of comparison of the fit indices of original theoretical model and 
alternative models in detail. The results indicated that expected 2 factor solution provided a 
good fit with the data (Ȥ2= 158.90, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .05, CFI = .98, GFI = .95). In 
addition, this solution provided a better fit than alternative one factor solution Ȥ2 = 446.71, 
RMSEA = .16, SRMR = .08, CFI = .93, GFI = .87). Chi square difference tests also 
showed that our expected model has a significantly better fit than one factor solution. 
These results suggested that our trust and fear of opportunism constructs are distinct. We 
also checked for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) that 
measure the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. 
VIF values of our variables ranged between 1.00 and 1.21 which indicate a lack of 
multicollinearity in our results (Hair et al., 1998).
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TABLE 8
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa
Variables N M SD 1 2 3 4 6
1 Gender 624 0.91 0.29
2 Age 613 44.29 14.80 .10*
3 Education level 624 4.66 1.28 -.04 .15***
4 Income level 596 2.50 1.63 .17*** .36*** .21***
6 Trust 630 5.42 1.08 -.03 .04 .01 -.02
7 Fear of 
opportunism
630 3.24 1.56 -.07† -.14*** -.01 -.04 -.55***
Note: Gender is dummy coded: Female =1, Male = 0. Age was measured in years. Education level variable had 6 
levels: 1 indicates “less than a high school degree” while 6 refers to a “PhD degree”. Income level variable had 8 
levels: 1 indicates “0 to 25,000 USD” while 6 refers to a “more than 500,000 USD”. Trust and fear of 
opportunism were self-reported on 7-point scales. 
† p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001
We tested our hypotheses by using hierarchical ordinary least squares regression 
analyses following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). In the first step we 
entered the control variables (i.e. income level and education level of solvers), in the 
second step we added age, gender and trust variables. Table 9 shows the results of this 
regression analysis. The table showed the significant negative effect of age on fear of 
opportunistic behavior after controlling for education and income level (ȕ = -.14, p < .001) 
supporting our first hypothesis. With respect to second hypothesis we also found a support 
that women have less fear of opportunism (ȕ = -.07, p < .05). 
90 
108
Chapter 4 
TABLE 9
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Trust and Fear of Opportunisma
Trust Fear of Opportunism
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Education 
level 
-.00 (.04) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.05) .02 (.05) .01    (.04)
Income level -.01* (.03) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.04) -.01 (.04) .00    (.04)
Age .07 (.00) -.15*** (.01) -.12** (.00)
Gender .03 (.16) -.09* (.23) -.07*  (.19)
Trust -.54*** (.05)
R2 .00 .01 .00 .03 .32
F .02 .68 .44 3.94 54.56
ǻ52 .00 .01 .00 .03
***
.29***
a Values are standardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Gender is dummy coded, Female = 1 
Male = 0
* p < .05, *** p < .001
To test whether trust mediated the relationship between gender, age and fear of 
opportunism, we followed causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986) and bootstrap 
procedures (Hayes, 2013; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that 
in order for a relationship to be mediated, three conditions should be met. First, the 
independent variable should have a significant effect on the mediator and dependent 
variable; second, the mediator variable should have a significant effect on the dependent 
variable; and last, bringing the mediator into the equation should reduce the magnitude of 
direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Table 9 demonstrates 
WKDWWKHILUVWFRQGLWLRQRIPHGLDWLRQLVQRWPHWDVWKHHIIHFWVRIDJHRQWUXVWVHH0RGHOȕ
= .07, S DQGJHQGHURQWUXVWZHUHQRWVLJQLILFDQWVHH0RGHOȕ S  We 
complemented this mediation analyses by testing the statistical significance of the indirect 
effects of age and gender on fear of opportunism through trust. To that end, we constructed 
bias-corrected confidence intervals on the basis of 5,000 random samples with replacement 
from the full sample (Hayes, 2013; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Mediation occurs if an indirect 
effect differs significantly from zero. The 95 % confidence intervals for the indirect effect 
of gender through trust included zero [-0.32, 0.12] which suggested that trust did not 
mediate the effect of gender on fear of opportunism. Trust also did not mediate the link 
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between age and fear of opportunism as the 95 % confidence interval included zero ([-
.007, 0.002]). These results reject the Hypotheses 3 and 4.
We also conducted two additional regression analyses with different operationalization 
of education and income level variables. In our original analysis, we treated income and 
education level variables as continuous variables. Education level scale was treated as a 6-
point scale and income level scale was treated as an 8-point scale. In the first post-hoc 
analysis, we treated education and income level variables as categorical variables; we 
created 5 and 7 dummy variables to measure education and income level categories, 
respectively. In the second post-hoc analysis, we excluded the education and income level 
categories that had less than 50 respondents from the regression analysis. As a whole, these 
supplemental regression analyses returned parallel results to the results reported in Table 9. 
This suggested that neither the small sample size in some categories of education and 
income level variables nor the potential alternative operationalizations of these variables 
affected our results and conclusions in general6. 
These results showed that trust, age and gender are significant predictors of fear of 
opportunism. Older people and women have less fear about their knowledge and ideas to 
be used opportunistically by others. In addition, people who trust more to the intermediary 
company in crowdsourcing platforms have less concern about the potential opportunistic 
behavior of the organizations that post their innovation problems in these platforms. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications
Our research highlights the significance of age and gender differences in fear of 
opportunism and identifies trust as an important determinant of such fears in 
crowdsourcing platforms. By doing so, we provide important theoretical implications. 
First, we take the first steps toward explaining gender and age differences in fear of 
6 Age was negatively and significantly related to fear of opportunism in both first and second post-hoc 
analysis (ȕ= -.15, p < .01; ȕ= -.11, p < .05, respectively ). The pattern of the results for  gender differences 
was also similar;  women had significantly less fear of opportunism  in both first and second post-hoc 
analysis (ȕ= -.09, p < .05; ȕ= -.09, p < .05, respectively). 
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opportunism. As fear of opportunism is the main barrier for knowledge sharing (e.g., 
Arrow, 1962), a better understanding of these fears has direct implications for knowledge 
sharing behavior. This study extends the line of knowledge sharing research that recently 
started to highlight individual differences in knowledge sharing but neglected demographic 
differences so far. In addition, our findings question the common assumption in the prior 
economics literature that fear of opportunism is the same among individuals as we identify 
a context where this common assumption does not hold. By showing demographic
differences in the experience of fear of opportunism, our findings imply that knowledge 
disclosure paradox might not be equally influential for everyone. We suggest that this 
paradox is more of a concern for men, younger people and for situations where a 
trustworthy relationship between the parties does not exist. Although we cannot generalize 
our findings to other contexts with our data, this paper takes the first steps to imply that a 
more nuanced perspective needs to be taken to comprehensively understand fear of 
opportunism. Moreover, we extend the psychology literature which extensively studied 
demographic differences in various psychological factors (e.g., Costa et al., 2001; 
Feingold, 1994; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) by showing gender and age differences in 
an important affective factor: fear of opportunistic behavior in knowledge sharing. 
In addition to highlighting the importance of demographic differences on fear of 
opportunism, our study extends the knowledge management literature by addressing the 
recent developments in organizational knowledge management practices. We examine an 
emerging medium of knowledge transfer for organizations, i.e. crowdsourcing practices 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012). More specifically, we investigate knowledge disclosure in a 
crowdsourcing platform where organizations post the problems that they want to gain 
knowledge about and people all over the world try to create relevant knowledge to solve 
those specific problems. So far, research mostly focused on knowledge sharing within the 
organization or knowledge transfer between different organizations while neglecting 
knowledge exchanges between organizations and crowdsourcing platforms. Our findings, 
thus, by examining the members’ fears of disclosing knowledge to an organization in a 
crowdsourcing platform, addresses the recent developments in organizations toward 
incorporating knowledge of people on a global scale by utilizing crowdsourcing. As these 
platforms are an emerging channel of open innovation and problem solving (e.g., Lampel 
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et al., 2012; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), our study also offers implications for innovation 
literature.
To our surprise, trust did not mediate the age and gender differences in fear of 
opportunism. Although, in line with the extant research, trust had a strong and significant 
negative effect on fear of opportunism, there were no significant gender and age 
differences in the experience of trust. One explanation to these non-significant differences 
could be the overall high level of trust towards the intermediary organization; solvers, as a 
whole, experience quite a high level of trust to InnoCentive. This overall high level of trust 
might be a consequence of InnoCentive’s proactivity and motivation in developing 
trustworthy relationships with their community members – a point that was widely noted in 
the in-depth interviews with InnoCentive employees. The speculation we have is that when 
individuals have a high level of trust and when the other party put intensive effort to 
develop trustworthy relationships, expected gender and age differences in trust might 
become dwindled. It could be the case that in a platform where the intermediary 
organization is not as proactive, gender and age differences in trust might become more 
salient. 
Although we did not find evidence for the mediation role of trust in the link between 
gender, age and fear of opportunism, our findings suggest a strong association between 
trust and fear of opportunism. This finding has implications for the literature on trust and 
knowledge sharing. To elaborate, we focused on the role of trust in knowledge exchanges 
where parties of the exchange do not know each other and an intermediary organization 
mediates this exchange. This context attaches a great importance to the intermediary 
organization in safeguarding the fairness of the exchanges. Therefore, we focused on the 
role of trust to the intermediary organization in mitigating fears associated with sharing 
knowledge with another organization. This contributes to trust literature as earlier studies 
typically showed the importance of trust in knowledge exchange relationships in traditional 
organizational settings when both parties know each other and in the absence of an 
intermediary organization (e.g. Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997; Woolthuis, 
2005). Therefore, by investigating trust and fear of opportunism link in the presence of an 
intermediary organization, we extend the earlier research on trust and knowledge sharing. 
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An indirect implication of our findings on how gender influence fear of opportunism in 
disclosing knowledge would for the study of Ding, Murray and Stuart (2006). They found 
that women academics patent at about 40% of the rate of men and suggested that lack of 
exposure to commercial market and higher concern about a potential hindering effect on 
university careers might be the possible reasons for this. As an alternative or additional 
explanation, since patents mainly serve to provide a protection of property rights (Arrow, 
1962; Huang & Murray, 2009), it might also be the case that women have less concerns for 
their knowledge to be stolen by other parties and have tendency to share her knowledge 
than the men.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
The contributions discussed above must be qualified in the lights of the limitations of 
this study. First, we employ a cross-sectional design in our data collection. Although this is 
unlikely to cause a problem between the demographic variables and fear of opportunism, 
the causality of the relationship between trust and fear of opportunism should be 
interpreted with caution. More specifically, trust influence a solver’s fear of opportunism 
as theorized in our model. Yet at the same time, a solver’s fear of opportunism might also 
influence his or her trust level to the organization. We strongly suggest future studies to 
use longitudinal designs for exploring the relationship between trust and fear of 
opportunism. 
Second, data on the constructs of interest are self-reported which raises the possibility 
of common method bias. Nevertheless, as trust and fear of opportunism constructs address 
emotional states of people and as they are latent constructs, we believe that collecting the 
data from participants themselves is the appropriate way. For the demographic variables, 
self-reported measure was the reasonable option since identity information of people in the 
Internet typically recorded based on self-reports of them. In addition, in order to minimize 
common method bias, we followed the remedies of Podsakoff and colleagues (2003) in
designing the survey, and separated questions used in this study from each other, 
protecting respondent confidentiality and reducing item ambiguity by developing the 
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questionnaire based on in-depth interviews and ethnographic investigation of online 
content.
Another limitation of our study is that we do not directly test the mechanisms that we 
proposed as the underlying reasons of the effect of age and gender on fear of opportunism. 
We believe that direct tests of the mechanisms we propose here would be beneficial to 
extend our understanding on age, gender and fear interplay in knowledge sharing. For 
instance, future research might directly measure emotional regulation or general 
perceptions toward the sincerity of others to shed light on the mechanisms how age and 
gender influence fear of opportunism in disclosing knowledge. Lastly, we conducted this 
study in a single crowdsourcing platform limiting external validity although it allowed us 
to control for platform level confounding variables. Future research could extend the 
generalizability of these findings by testing these propositions in different platforms and 
contexts. 
Practical Implications
Our findings provide several important practical implicaitons with respect to designing 
crowdsourcing contests. Taking fear of opportunism and the demographic differences in 
such fears into account in the design of crowdsourcing contests (e.g., intellectual property 
protection and compensation structure) and in communication with the participants (e.g., 
informing them how opportunistic behavior will be avoided) might be important factors in 
accumulating a large and diversified knowledge pool via crowdsourcing contests. Our 
findings on gender and age differences suggest that plans and policies to mitigate the fears 
of male and younger participants in these contests are particularly important. Contest 
organizers therefore might consider taking a proactive approach to inform male and 
younger participants regarding how the opportunistic behavior will be avoided. Contest 
organizers can also assess the level of fear of opportunism among contest participants with 
the scale of this study and, if participants experience high levels of fear of opportunism, 
they might consider modifying the intellectual property structure or making it more 
transparent to mitigate such fears. In addition, we highlight the importance of gaining trust 
of the community members for having a large knowledge pool in crowdsourcing platforms. 
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We found that trust to the intermediary organization (i.e. the organization that owns the 
crowdsourcing platform) is a significant determinant of fears of opportunism in sharing 
knowledge. Investments and activities for developing trustworthy relationships with the 
members of the community are, therefore, very important for the flow of knowledge in 
crowdsourcing platforms. 
More indirectly, this study also points to an alternative channel, crowdsourcing 
platforms, for involving women and older people in scientific activities. Given the 
underrepresentation of women in science (Ding et al., 2006; Handelsman, Cantor, Carnes, 
& Denton, 2005), the aging of the population and increased life expectancy (Lutz, 
Sanderson, & Scherbov, 2008; Vaupel & Loichinger, 2006), using different means to 
involve women and elders in science is crucial.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A6
Qualitative Data Sources
Data Source Interviews Netnography
InnoCentive Employees 13 
Solver Interviews 10
InnoCentive Blog Posts 358 posts
InnoCentive Forum Posts 77 posts
LinkedIn Group Posts and Comments 193 posts
TABLE A7
Scale Items for Trust and Fear of Opportunism Constructs
Trust to InnoCentive (adapted from Robinson (1996)Į 
I believe InnoCentive has high integrity.
I can expect InnoCentive to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion.
InnoCentive is not always honest and truthful.
In general, I believe InnoCentive’s motives and intentions are good.
I don’t think InnoCentive treats me fairly.
InnoCentive is open and upfront with me.
I am not sure if I fully trust InnoCentive.
Fear of Opportunism (adapted from John (1984) and Morgan and Hunt (1994)Į 
I think seekers will steal my ideas.
I think seekers will use my solution without paying me.
I think seekers will change the facts in order not to pay me the award I deserve.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
dea generation and problem solving for innovation used to be an exclusive domain 
for employees and believed to be best kept entirely within the organizational 
boundaries. In recent years, however, the source of innovation shifted toward more 
open innovation models (Chesbrough, 2003). Research on these models extensively 
showed that utilizing external sources of innovation can deliver results that are superior to 
internally generated innovations thanks to increased product diversity and better match of 
products and consumer preferences (Almirall & Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Chesbrough, 
2003; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). The Internet and advance of 
communication technologies allowed organizations to extend their openness immensely 
by allowing them to reach and attract more individuals and share information effectively 
(Lampel et al., 2012). An emerging and potentially groundbreaking way to harness the 
expertise, skills and creativity of individuals worldwide is opening up innovation 
processes for the input from the crowd. 
In this dissertation, we aimed to extend our understanding on the use of 
crowdsourcing for innovation purposes by focusing on motivational, knowledge and 
relational underpinnings for idea generation and sharing in crowdsourcing platforms. The 
reason why we focus on these three areas (i.e., motivational, knowledge-related and 
relational factors) is that we consider them as the core behavioral factors that are likely to 
influence knowledge sharing and creation. In doing so, we strive to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms behind crowd’s behavior and 
contributions. In addressing motivational mechanisms, we focused on the role of 
I
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monetary rewards and different motivational orientations in stimulating creative 
engagement and creativity. With regards to knowledge mechanisms, we shed light on how 
expertise and knowledge search behavior influence problem solving performance in 
crowdsourcing platforms. Finally, we aimed to shed light on the relational mechanisms by 
examining the individual differences and the role of trust in fear of opportunism –the 
main relational risk in sharing knowledge in crowdsourcing platforms. 
OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS: TOWARDS A BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING OF CROWDSOURCING
Motivational Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing
One of the goals of this dissertation was understanding the role of monetary rewards 
as it is one of the most extensively used tools to motivate people for a desired outcome 
and central in the design of crowdsourcing contests. We found that the effect of reward 
size on solver engagement is contingent on prosocial motivation of individuals. To 
elaborate, reward size has a significant positive effect on creative engagement of people 
with low prosocial motivation; however, this effect diminishes with the increased level of 
prosocial motivation. We replicated this study in a laboratory experiment and found that 
this interaction effect also holds for creative performance.
Another goal of this dissertation was identifying motivations of solvers in 
crowdsourcing platforms. We identified four broad groups of motives that drive people to 
engage in challenges in crowdsourcing platforms: intrinsic, prosocial, self-improvement 
and extrinsic motivation. 
x Intrinsic motivation: Intrinsic motivation refers to fun and intellectual 
challenge feelings experienced while solving a problem. 
x Prosocial motivation: Prosocial motivation refers to the desire to exert effort 
for benefiting and positively impacting others. 
x Self-improvement motivation: Solvers with self-improvement motivation 
engage in challenges to learn new things and develop their skills. 
x Extrinsic motivation: Extrinsic motivation refers to the desire to gain money, 
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recognition and future career opportunities. 
The effects of these four groups of motives on creative engagement were different. 
The results revealed that extrinsic motivation is positively associated with the creative 
engagement in a challenge. Self-improvement motivation, however, has a negative effect 
on creative engagement. The main effects of intrinsic and prosocial motivation on 
engagement are not statistically significant while the interaction between them has a
significant effect on engagement in solving the problem. 
Knowledge Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing
Second focus of this thesis was to understand on knowledge mechanisms of problem 
solving in crowdsourcing platforms. To that end, we focused on how expertise of solvers 
and their knowledge search behavior concurrently influence problem solving 
performance. We distinguished knowledge search behavior between knowledge search 
depth and breadth. In an attempt to have a fine-grained analysis, we further distinguished 
between knowledge search depths as depth in same, related and different domain 
compared the domain of the problem. The results showed a significant main effect of 
expertise on problem solving performance and a negative main effect of knowledge 
search breadth on the performance. More interestingly, we found significant three-way 
interactions between expertise, knowledge search depth and breadth. Expertise is 
positively related to problem solving performance: when it is accompanied with a (1) high 
knowledge search breadth and low search depth in the domain of problem (i.e., same 
domain) or (2) high knowledge search breadth and low search depth outside the 
knowledge domain of the problem (i.e., different domain) or (3) high knowledge search 
breadth and high search depth in the boundaries of the domain of the problem (i.e., in a 
related domain).
Relational Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing 
The goal of this chapter was to contribute to a better understanding of fear of 
opportunism which is the main relational risk in crowdsourcing platforms and critical 
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factor in solvers’ knowledge sharing behavior. To that end, first, we investigated whether 
solvers have demographic differences in the experience of fear of opportunism. Our
findings provide strong evidence for gender and age differences in a way that women and 
older people have significantly less fears. Education and income level, on the other hand, 
had no influence on experienced fears. Second, we examined the role of trust in affecting 
fear of opportunism. We found that trust in the owner of the crowdsourcing platform 
plays a major role in mitigating fears of opportunism. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This thesis, as a whole, contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics of crowdsourcing practices for innovation purposes. This is of great importance 
for innovation literature since using crowd as an innovation partner has enormous 
potential in enhancing organizational innovativeness by allowing access to a diverse 
source of new product ideas and creative solutions for vexing problems that arise in the 
new product development processes (Bayus, 2013; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Jeppesen 
& Lakhani, 2010). Addressing the call for integrating insights from different disciplines to 
create an understanding of how crowdsourcing work (Lampel et al., 2012), we examined 
motivational, knowledge and relational mechanisms of crowdsourcing by drawing on 
insights from social psychology of creativity, economics of knowledge creation and 
disclosure and strategy literature on knowledge search and problem solving. In doing so, 
this thesis has several distinct theoretical contributions. 
First, we contribute to creativity literature by examining the effects of motives and 
rewards on creative engagement and creativity in our first study. By introducing prosocial 
motivation as a moderator in the reward-creativity link, we shed light on a widely-noted 
controversy in the literature regarding the effects of rewards on creativity (e.g., Baer et 
al., 2003; Shalley et al., 2004). In addition, we emphasized the mediating role of creative 
engagement in the relationship between rewards and creativity. Creative engagement was 
implicitly assumed as a mediating mechanism in this link but this role was not empirically 
tested (Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Gagne & Deci, 2005). To the best of my knowledge, 
this thesis is the first study to provide evidence for the mediating role of creative 
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engagement in the reward-creativity link. Moreover, we extend the recent research 
focusing on the role of motivational interactions on creativity. Although researchers found 
that intrinsic and prosocial motivation constructively interact in influencing creativity 
(Grant & Berry, 2011), interactive effects of prosocial motivation and extrinsic 
motivation remain unexplored. Also, we show that different motives have distinct effects 
on creative engagement which contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of 
motivational antecedents of creativity. As a whole, these findings extend our 
understanding of the complex motivational processes of creativity. 
Second, this thesis offers implications for economics literature on prize contests. 
Economists often assumed that individual and total level of efforts will be increased with 
larger prizes (Kreps, 1997; Prendergast, 1999). The findings of this thesis, however, offer
a boundary condition for innovation contests for the reinforcing effect of prize size: Prizes 
will only encourage more effort for people with low prosocial motivation. In addition, 
although economists often merely focused on prizes as the main incentive in innovation 
contests, our findings, in line with recent research (Murray et al., 2012), suggest a more 
nuanced perspective in this respect. More specifically, incentives in contests are multiple 
which includes intrinsic, prosocial and self-improvement motives. As a whole, these 
findings contribute to the recent perspective that calls for going beyond the traditional 
economic perspectives and creating an integrated theory for understanding incentives 
which considers both economic and psychological factors (Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012).    
Third, this thesis has implications for micro-level knowledge creation and problem 
solving theory by examining the individual level effect of expertise and knowledge search
behavior on problem solving performance. More specifically, we theorized and found that 
expertise will interact with the knowledge search behavior (i.e., search depth and breadth) 
in influencing problem solving performance. The main contribution of this finding is 
shedding light on the equivocal findings on the expertise-problem solving performance 
link as we show when expertise is more likely to contribute performance depending on 
certain search behaviors in solving innovation problems. Also, this thesis takes a step 
toward bridging theories from expertise research in psychology literature and knowledge 
search research in management literature which often remained isolated. In doing so, we 
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offer a fine-grained framework for knowledge mechanisms of problem solving. 
Fourth, this thesis has implications for micro level knowledge disclosure theory. We
took a relational perspective and focused on the main relational risk for disclosing 
knowledge in crowdsourcing platforms: opportunistic behavior. Opportunistic behavior is 
central to transaction cost theory as its’ main behavioral assumption (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004) and it is the main barrier for disclosure of valuable knowledge (Anton & 
Yao, 2002; Arrow, 1962). Prior research often considered a uniform effect of fear of 
opportunism on all individuals. This thesis, by showing gender and age differences in the 
experience of fear of opportunism, extends transaction cost theory and economics of 
knowledge disclosure literature. In addition, we emphasize the role of trust in mitigating 
such fears. Although, earlier research widely shown that trust is important in reducing 
perceptions of relational risks (Nooteboom et al., 1997; Woolthuis, 2005), we extend this 
literature by going beyond the traditional contexts (e.g., traditional inter and intra 
organizational trust) by studying the role of trust in a previously unexplored context. 
Fifth, having a better understanding of crowdsourcing also has implications for 
knowledge based theory of the firm (KBT). This view emphasize problem solving and 
suggests that creating valuable new knowledge by solving problems is the primary 
knowledge-based objective of managers (Nickerson, Yen, & Mahoney, 2011; e.g., 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Given that crowdsourcing is highly important as it can 
improve problem-solving effectiveness immensely (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010), a better understanding of crowdsourcing is important in knowledge based 
view. There is a fundamental difference in how search for solutions is conducted in a 
crowdsourcing platform than local or traditional external search. That is, traditionally 
organizations that search for solutions in advance identify relevant knowledge domains 
for a given problem (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) whereas in crowdsourcing search is 
open to any knowledge domain that deems themselves qualified to generate a solution 
(Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). This difference might have 
important consequences for problem solving effectiveness since large and diverse 
knowledge pool that crowdsourcing creates offers a unique opportunity for analogical 
transfer between seemingly unrelated fields (Schilling et al., 2003) and for recombining 
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different knowledge (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Thus, a 
better understanding of crowdsourcing phenomenon will extend the knowledge based 
theory of firm. This thesis, as a whole, contributes to that understanding.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CROWDSOURCING 
PLATFORMS
This thesis provides clear guidelines on how to better manage crowdsourcing 
platforms. First set of imlplications are about motives and the role of rewards in 
crowdsourcing platforms. Managers that want to harness the power of the crowd should 
start with recognizing the diversity of motives individuals have. Crowds might engage in 
idea generation and problem solving because they love solving problems, want to learn 
new things, want to contribute something that matters and are willing to gain extrinsic 
outcomes such as money or reputation. It is of great importance to know what motivates 
crowd because different motives do not have the same effect on crowd’s level of 
engagement in generating creative ideas. The results encourage managers to highlight
non-monetary extrinsic benefits –recognition and career benefits. Another important 
implication of this thesis for managers is that effects of different motivation are not 
independent from each other. Some motives work synergistically while others destruct 
each others effect. Managers should provide and communitcate intrinsic and prosocial 
reasons (e.g., fun and helping aspects respectively) together, as they enhance each others’ 
effect on engagement. On the other hand, monetary rewards and prosocial motivation 
diminish each others’ effect. Managers should not use monetary rewards for the 
challenges that have salient prosocial aspects or for the individuals that are likely to be 
prosocially motivated. Put differently, when monetary rewards are used managers would 
benefit from being subtle about communicating prosocial aspects. 
Another set of managerial implicatios for managing crowdsourcing is regarding 
knowledge mechanisms. This thesis encourages managers to provide tools for experts to 
search knowledge beyond their domain of expertise: Experts are most successful in 
solving problems when they broadly search for solutions in different knowledge domains, 
shallowly use knowledge in same (i.e., problem domain) and different domains (i.e., 
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outside the problem domain) while utilizing related knowledge (i.e., in the boundaries of 
the problem domain) deeply. Managers can encourage experts to engage in a search for 
solutions that will increase the chances of solving the problem by providing creative 
training or using specific instructions. 
Lastly, this thesis has implications for how to mitigate the fears about the main 
relational risk (i.e., opportunistic behavior) in crowdsourcing platforms which is highly 
important for continuous disclosure of solutions. The findings suggest managers to 
develop plans for building trust for helping solvers to overcome such fears. Managers can, 
for instance, communicate proactively what they do about ensuring fairness of the 
exchange between crowd and firms, be transparent about how solutions are assessed and 
address any concerns that crowd might have. In addition, we suggest managers to have a
specific focus on the plans and actions to mitigate the fears of men and younger people as 
they experience relatively higher levels of fears.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? SOME AVENUES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
I hope this thesis set the stage for further improvement of our understanding of 
crowdsourcing platforms. Our study focused on having a comprehensive understanding of 
motivational, affective and cognitive factors that influence contributions received in one 
of the most prevalent crowdsourcing platform for innovation:  InnoCentive. The form of 
the involvement of the crowd was in a tournament structure, also called as tournament-
based crowdsourcing, innovation contests, design competitions or innovation tournaments
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Lampel et al., 2012; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 
2008). This form of crowdsourcing is one of the most common ways of involving crowd 
and very effective in solving complex innovation problems and gathering breakthrough 
ideas (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). Nevertheless, organizations can also involve crowd in 
a more collaborative manner, instead of a competitive structure (Bayus, 2013). Among 
others, for instance, BMW, Dell and Starbucks harness the potential of the crowd by 
creating communities for their users to proactively generate ideas and collaborate with 
each other in improving those ideas. Addressing the dynamics of crowd involvement in a 
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collaboration-based structure would be a natural extension to my research and enhance 
our understanding of crowdsourcing. In this respect, I believe one of the promising 
research directions is to examine role of collaboration in such communities by taking a 
network perspective. For example, future research might examine how the interactions 
with other community members, position in the network or strength of the ties with other 
members influence qualities of the ideas generated in these crowdsourcing platforms. 
A promising research direction is the effects of past experience in crowdsourcing 
platforms. Different experiences in the platform might have different consequences for 
crowd’s subsequent behavior and outcomes. For example, disaggregating past 
experiences into success and failure experiences and examining how these experiences 
impact further engagement and success in the subsequent idea might extend our 
understanding. Bayus (2013) took first steps in this respect by showing past success make 
individuals more incremental and less diverse in their subsequent ideas in Dell IdeaStorm 
platform. Researchers could also investigate several moderating factors that impact the 
link between past experiences, learning and success. Some examples for moderator 
variables include feedback from the company and complexity levels of the idea 
generation and problem solving tasks. Addressing these factors might have important 
implications for sustaining supply of quality ideas over time. 
A valuable extension to my research would be investigating the dynamics of crowd 
involvement in different stages of new product development processes. In this 
dissertation, my focus was on involvement of crowd for idea generation for the front end 
of innovation and problem solving to improve innovation processes. It will be very 
interesting to see how crowd will contribute to other stages of new product development 
processes since crowdsourcing has important potential to improve other stages as well. 
For example, researchers could focus on the role and effectiveness of crowd in the 
selection of products or concept testing. Future research could also focus on 
crowdsourcing platforms as an outlet for communication and channel for customer 
feedback before, during and after the commercialization stage of product development. 
Future research could also focus on different consequences of innovation 
crowdsourcing practices. An interesting research direction, in this respect, is focusing on 
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psychological consequences of using crowdsourcing on customers’ emotions and 
perceptions about the company and product. For example, recent research found that 
customer co-creation enhances customers’ perceptions of firms’ innovative ability and 
customer orientation (Fuchs & Schreier, 2011; Schreier, Fuchs, & Dahl, 2012). 
Researchers could examine whether involving crowdsourcing communities has other 
psychological consequences such as perceived reliability or conformance of the product. 
In addition, future research could investigate whether these psychological consequences 
unfold differently in different industries or product groups. For instance, customers’ 
perceptions regarding innovativeness of a crowdsourced product might be different (and 
perhaps negative) for a high-tech product where innovativeness might be more associated 
with deep technical knowledge. 
Another fruitful research direction to pursue is formulation of the problem in 
crowdsourcing platforms. Appropriate formulation of innovation problems is critical for 
subsequent performance in problem solving (Spradlin, 2012) as noted several decades ago 
by Einstein and Infeld “formulation of a problem is often more essential than the 
solution” (1938: 92). Formulation of the problem has certain consequences in terms of 
diversity of crowd that engage in the problem and qualities of the solutions they generate. 
For instance, describing an innovation problem very specifically and setting too many 
constraints will restrict diverse group of people to participate in the problem and the 
search scope for solution and, in turn, likely to limit the novelty of the solutions. On the 
other hand, keeping the problem too broad and vague might limit feasibility and 
usefulness of solutions although it might trigger out of the box thinking.
I also see promising directions for future research on understanding how the ideas 
generated by crowdsourcing communities are received by the employees of the 
organizations. As harnessing benefits of crowdsourcing is very much contingent on how 
these ideas are used in the innovation processes, focus on assessment of these ideas is of 
great merit in expanding our understanding of innovation crowdsourcing. Researchers 
could focus on affective factors (e.g., “not-invented-here” syndrome) or cognitive factors 
(e.g., decision making biases) in evaluation of crowdsourced ideas. Answering these 
questions has certain implications for improving new product processes as these 
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evaluations affect important decisions such as which ideas will be implemented and how 
much resources will be allocated for those, both of which would greatly influence new 
product success. For example, if an employee has negative prejudgments about the 
credibility and value of the ideas that come from crowdsourcing communities, he is more 
likely to reject those ideas or commit less to it no matter how great the idea is. 
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Summary
The Internet and the advance of communication technologies have brought 
unprecedented opportunities for harnessing the creative potential of people all over the 
world. In an attempt to utilize this potential to explore breakthrough new product ideas and 
find solutions to challenging innovation problems, companies make extensive use of 
crowdsourcing practices. However, despite its promise, our knowledge of crowdsourcing is 
limited. 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to a greater understanding of the 
dynamics of crowdsourcing by providing a comprehensive investigation of the behavioral 
factors that influence innovative behavior and the performance of the crowd. In particular, 
we examine motivational, knowledge and relational mechanisms of crowd engagement, 
creativity and knowledge-sharing behavior. We demonstrate that crowd members engage 
in new product ideation and innovative problem solving for different reasons (i.e., 
intrinsic, extrinsic, prosocial and learning motivation), and monetary rewards impact 
creativity in different ways, according to individuals’ prosocial motivation. In addition, we 
find that a crowd member’s performance in solving innovation problems is a consequence 
of the interplay between his/her expertise and how broadly and deeply he/she searches for 
solutions. Finally, we show that fear of opportunism by others – the main relational risk 
attached to disclosing knowledge in crowdsourcing platforms – is not uniform among 
crowd members, and trust in the owner of the crowdsourcing platform is central in 
assuaging such fears. As a whole, the studies in this dissertation provide important insights 
into how crowdsourcing platforms can be better designed and how the immense creative 
potential of the crowd can be used more effectively.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Het Internet en de opmars van communicatietechnologieën hebben ongekende 
mogelijkheden voor organisaties geschapen om het creatieve potentieel van mensen 
wereldwijd aan te boren. In een poging dit potentieel voor baanbrekende producten en 
oplossingen voor uitdagende innovatieproblemen te benutten maken bedrijven veel gebruik 
van crowdsourcing. Er is echter, ondanks de hoge verwachtingen, slechts zeer beperkte 
wetenschappelijke kennis over crowdsourcing.
Het belangrijkste doel van deze dissertatie is om bij te dragen tot een beter begrip van 
de dynamiek van crowdsourcing door middel van een grondig onderzoek naar de 
gedragsmatige factoren die invloed hebben op gedrag en prestaties van contribuanten aan 
innovatie door middel van crowdsourcing. In het bijzonder onderzoeken wij motivationele, 
kennisgerelateerde en relationele mechanismen die van invloed zijn op betrokkenheid, 
creativiteit en kennisoverdracht van contribuanten. We tonen aan dat contribuanten om
verschillende redenen meewerken aan het ontwikkelen van nieuwe producten en 
innovatieve oplossingen (i.e. intrinsieke, extrinsieke, pro-sociale en 
zelfontwikkelingsmotivatie) en dat de impact van financiële beloningen op creativiteit 
afhankelijk is van de pro-sociale motivatie van de persoon. Daarnaast laten we zien dat de 
prestaties van een individu bij het oplossen van innovatie-problemen het resultaat zijn van 
het samenspel van zijn/haar expertise en van de breedte en diepte waarmee hij of zij naar 
oplossingen zoekt. Ten slotte tonen we aan dat het ervaren van zorgen over opportunistisch 
gedrag (het belangrijkste relationele risico bij het delen van kennis in platformen van 
crowdsourcing) niet uniform verdeeld is over de menigte en dat vertrouwen in de eigenaar 
van het crowdsourcing-platform cruciaal is om dergelijke zorgen te verminderen. Als 
geheel bieden de onderzoeken in deze dissertatie belangrijke inzichten om het ontwerp van 
crowdsourcing-platformen te verbeteren en effectiever gebruik te maken van het immense 
creatieve potentieel van de buitenwereld bij innovatie.
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Özet (Summary in Turkish)
øQWHUQHW YH LOHWLúLP WHNQRORMLOHULQGHNL JHOLúPHOHU GQ\DQÕQ KHUKDQJL ELU \HULQGHNL
\DUDWÕFÕOÕN SRWDQVL\HOLQH XODúPD QRNWDVÕQGD HúL J|UOPHPLú IÕUVDWODU JHWLUGL )LUPDODU
FURZGVRXUFLQJ NLWOH ND\QDN X\JXODPDODUÕ\OD EX SRWDQVL\HOL UDGLNDO \HQL UQOHU
JHOLúWLUPHN YH ]RUOX LQRYDV\RQ SUREOHPOHULQL o|]PHN LoLQ \R÷XQ ELU úHNLOGH
NXOODQPDNWDODU$QFDNEX\NVHNSRWDQVL\HOLQHUD÷PHQFURZGVRXUFLQJLOHLOJLOLDNDGHPLN
ELOJLPL]FRNNÕVÕWOÕ
%L] EX WH]GH ELUH\OHULQ FURZGVRXUFLQJ SODWIRUPODUÕQGDNL GDYUDQÕúODUÕQÕ LQFHOHGLN YH
E|\OHOLNOH FURZGVRXUFLQJLQ LQRYDV\RQ LoLQ NXOODQÕPÕQGDNL GLQDPLNOHUH ÕúÕN WXWPD\D
oDOÕúWÕNg]HOOLNOH EXSODWIRUPODUGDNL LQVDQODUÕQPRWLYDV\RQODUÕQÕQ ELOJL G]H\OHULQLQ YH
SUREOHP o|]PH \|QWHPOHULQLQ RQODUÕQ LQRYDWLI GDYUDQÕúODUÕQÕ YH SHUIRUPDQVÕQÕ QDVÕl 
HWNLOHGL÷LQL J|VWHUGLN %XQD HN RODUDN EX SODWIRUPODUGDNL ELUH\OHULQ HNRQRPLN RODUDN
ROGXNoDGH÷HUOLRODQILNLUYHo|]POHULQLSD\ODúPDVÕQÕHWNLOH\HELOHFHNIDNW|UOHULLQFHOHGLN
YH EX NRQXGDNL IDUNOÕOÕNODUÕQ ND\QD÷LQL DUDúWÕUGÕN %LU EWQ RODUDN EX WH]LQ EXOJXODUÕ
FURZGVRXUFLQJ SODWIRUPODUÕQÕQÕQ GDKD L\L GL]D\Q HGLOHELOPHVL YH GDKD HIHNWLI
NXOODQÕODELOPHVLLoLQ|QHPOLWDYVL\HOHUVXQPDNWDGLU
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UNPACKING MOTIVATIONAL, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIONAL MECHANISMS OF
INNOVATIVE BEHAVIOR IN CROWDSOURCING PLATFORMS
The Internet and the advance of communication technologies have brought unprece -
dented opportunities for harnessing the creative potential of people all over the world. In
an attempt to utilize this potential to explore breakthrough new product ideas and find
solutions to challenging innovation problems, companies make extensive use of crowd -
sourcing practices. However, despite its promise, our knowledge of crowdsourcing is limited.
In this dissertation, we contribute to a greater understanding of the dynamics of
crowdsourcing by providing a comprehensive investigation of the behavioral factors that
influence innovative behavior and the performance of the crowd. Specifically, we examine
motivational, knowledge and relational mechanisms of crowd engagement, creativity and
knowledge-sharing behavior. We demonstrate that crowd members engage in new product
ideation and innovative problem solving for different reasons (i.e., intrinsic, extrin sic,
prosocial and learning motivation), and monetary rewards impact creativity in different
ways, according to individuals’ prosocial motivation. In addition, we find that a crowd
member’s performance in solving innovation problems is a consequence of the interplay
between his/her expertise and how broadly and deeply he/she searches for solutions.
Finally, we show that fear of opportunism by others – the main relational risk attached to
disclosing knowledge in crowdsourcing platforms – is not uniform among crowd members,
and trust in the owner of the crowdsourcing platform is central in assuaging such fears. As
a whole, the studies in this dissertation provide important insights into how crowd sourcing
platforms can be better designed and how the immense creative potential of the crowd
can be used more effectively.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by
ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands
Tel. +31 10 408 11 82
Fax +31 10 408 96 40
E-mail info@erim.eur.nl
Internet www.erim.eur.nl
B&T14248 omslag Acar
